Moving toward free and fair elections in Egypt

In an environment where elections are valued and voters have confidence in election authorities, it still is a challenge for governments to carry out free and fair elections. In Egypt, since Gamal Abdul Nasser took power in 1954 and abolished political parties, elections have never been a fair competition for power. Until 2005, the Constitution required the President to be approved in a single candidate referendum.  The first multi-party presidential elections took place that year. In presidential, parliamentary and local elections, Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP) prevented viable candidates from registering, restricted their financing, controlled media coverage, restricted campaigning, and used state resources to influence voting. NDP candidates at risk of losing employed thugs to attack supporters of their opponents. In voting stations, NDP officials stuffed ballot boxes, manipulated vote counts and "lost" ballot boxes transported to central facilities.

In 2005 and 2006, the Elections Commission opposed international monitoring and severely limited monitoring of polling stations by Egyptian civil society. Nevertheless, donors, including USAID, funded thousands of civil society monitors. USAID even funded unofficial international monitoring missions organized by the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute. While some of the monitors were prevented from entering polling stations, the combined monitoring operation provided a clear picture of widespread fraud and election abuses.  I experienced vote selling first-hand. As a USAID employee, I joined a group of Embassy employees monitoring the parliamentary elections.  At one station, a woman leaving the polls came up to me and asked for the money she was promised in return for voting NDP.

In efforts to address severe criticism of the electoral process, the Constitution was amended in 2007 to establish the High Elections Commission as an independent and judge-led election management body (Article 88). It has independent legal status and an independent budget. In the 2010 parliamentary elections, it recognized that abuses took place in many electoral districts, but declared the elections were run properly and reflected the will of the people. It condemned those monitoring groups and media who gave the impression that abuses were widespread and systemic. Many Egyptians believe the Commission cannot avoid bias. Four of the Commission's eleven positions are public figures selected by the Parliament, both houses of which have been controlled by the NDP.

Cynicism about the election process led Egyptians to insist that judges monitor the polling stations and receive complaints. A Supreme Constitutional Court ruling in 2000 required judges to monitor all polling stations in three rounds of voting. In most cases, judges have carried out their responsibilities seriously. However, a 2007 constitutional amendment (Article 88) prevented judges from covering all polling stations by requiring that elections take place in one day. Egypt has only enough judges to oversee a third of the polls in one day, and the remainder must be overseen by Ministry of Interior employees, in whom citizens have little confidence. Removal of Article 88 was one of the major objectives of the pro-democracy movement.

Even when judges are monitoring polling stations, their authority is restricted to the inside of the stations. They have no jurisdiction over abuses by security personnel and party officials outside of the stations, including vote-buying, establishing barriers to entrance and improper campaigning.

Citizens who wish to vote must present their voter card or present some form of photo identification and verify that they are registered at the polling station. One obstacle to voting is gaining an identification card.  Millions of citizens, particularly women and the poor, have either not attempted to get IDs or have faced obstacles in doing so.  They also are unable to register to vote for most of the year. Voter registration is only possible during a few months of the year. Consequently, many citizens are disenfranchised.

The seriousness of the Military Commission's commitment to democratic reform will be demonstrated by its support for revising Article 88 and other Constitutional provisions that prevent free and fair elections.  The Commission intends to submit the changes proposed by the Constitutional Review Committee for public debate and then for approval in a referendum.  I am confident that citizens will be much more engaged in this process than they were for the Constitutional referendums organized under President Mubarak, which were met by voter apathy.

I am less confident, however that Egypt will be ready to hold free and fair elections within the six month time limit set by the Military Commission. The challenges are enormous, requiring reform of the Ministry of Interior, attacks on systemic corruption and a change in the mentality of thousands of government officials.  Civil society must be vigilant in holding election administrators accountable.  It is certain, however, that the courage and commitment of those who overthrew Mubarak will serve them well in moving towards free and fair elections over the next few years.

Rick Gold

Cross-posted in Secular Perspectives

The Battle over Egypt's Secular and Muslim Character

One of the major objectives of the Egyptian revolution is to create a system that allows Egyptians to influence decision-making by democratic institutions. Since the 1920's, secular parties and the Muslim Brotherhood have fought over the degree to which the country's Constitution, laws, regulations, and programs reflect a separation or integration of religion and state. From 1923-1980, secularism was the dominant feature of Egyptian Constitutions. However, in 1980, to reduce pressure on the regime from the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic political groups, President Sadat initiated an amendment to Article 2 of the Constitution, which now states, "Principles of Islamic Law (Sharia) are the principal source of legislation."  Egypt, which has a civil law system inspired by France, was subsequently required to verify that laws or draft laws are consistent with Islamic law. In practice, this requirement applied only to personal status laws, dealing with such issues as marriage, divorce, child support and inheritance. Criminal laws, as contained in the Penal Code, have not been reviewed from a perspective of Sharia.

The Constitution contains other references to the Muslim character of the state. Article 2 contains, "Islam is the religion of the state..." Article 19 reads, "Religious education shall be a principal subject in the courses of general education."

These provisions are balanced by statements promoting freedom of religion and opposing discrimination. Article 46 affirms, "The state shall guarantee the freedom of belief and the freedom of practice of religious rites." Article 40 declares, "All citizens are equal before the law. They have equal public rights and duties without discrimination between them due to race, ethnic origin, language, religion or creed."

After the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), fielding candidates running as independents in 2005, won 20% of the seats of the the People's Assembly, President Mubarak in 2007 pushed through an Amendment of Article 5, which forbids using religion in political campaigns. It reads, "Citizens have the right to organize political parties according to the law, and no political activity shall be exercised nor political parties established on the basis of religion or discrimination due to gender or race."  This amendment, reflecting a secular outlook, effectively prohibits the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups from competing in elections.

One of the novelties of the mass movement that unseated Mubarak was that it brought together secularists with Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters.  The unstated implication was that everyone supported removal of the religious restrictions of Article 5, so that the Muslim Brotherhood could participate in elections. Whether the Constitution is amended or replaced, the new language will establish no restrictions on electoral participation by the MB.

The Constitution is the basic law of Egypt, but many of its provisions were inapplicable during the full thirty years of the Mubarak regime, since the country was under a state of emergency. Throughout this time, Mubarak manipulated laws, government, justice institutions and the media to divide Christians and Muslims, discriminate against minorities such as Baha'is, Shias, atheists and homosexuals, and persecute leaders and members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Coptic Christians, who constitute about 10% of the population, were prevented from building and repairing churches, restricted from certain professions and inadequately protected from occasional attacks by thugs. Many Egyptians accuse State Security of organizing attacks on churches and stores owned by Copts.

One set of issues targeted by Egyptian human rights advocates, including the anti-Mubarak group Kifaya, are the obstacles faced by Baha'is, atheists and members of other unofficially recognized religions in gaining identification papers.  ID cards, whether in paper or electronic version, are required for employment, education, banking, owning property, health care, traveling, birth, death, marriage, divorce, and vaccination of children.  The Ministry of Interior required citizens to indicate their religion on the cards, but they were given only three choices: Islam; Christianity; and Judaism.  Unless the 2,000 Baha'is were prepared to lie about their religion, they had difficulty gaining access to these cards. In 2006, the Ministry of Interior asked USAID for assistance in completing distribution of ID cards to several million citizens.  It refused USAID's offer to provide assistance from the US organization IFES to insure that all citizens, including Baha'is, could receive their cards.  Several court cases tested the Government's position on this issue, and Cairo's Court of Administrative Justice ruled in favor of the Baha'is in January 2008. The Ministry of Interior changed its policy to issue the first ID cards, without any religion noted, to two Baha'i teenagers in August 2009.

In February 2011, a constitutional review committee was mandated by the military to draft revisions to several articles. Its mandate does not include articles that define the secular or Muslim character of the state or the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in elections. In defining the tasks of the committee, the military assumed that an elected government would be in a better position to deal with these issues, either through constitutional amendments or by putting in place a new constitution.

Both secular groups and the Muslim Brotherhood are preparing for the inevitable battle over the secular or religious character of the Egyptian state. Secular groups are focusing on these general principles:
1. All Egyptians are born free and equal in dignity and rights
2. All Egyptians have the right of free thought and religion.
3. All Egyptians are equal before the law.
4. Any Egyptian is entitled to all rights and freedoms without distinction such as race, gender, religion or origin.
5. An Egyptian secular (civil) state is the only way to achieve these objectives.

The Muslim Brotherhood released a draft platform in 2007 that attempted to lay out its approach to governance. It included the formation of a council of religious scholars, elected by religious leaders. This council would advise the legislative and executive branches on religious law. Parliamentarians would determine which Islamic teachings are authoritative. The Supreme Constitutional Court would be the final arbiter. Women and non-Muslims would be excluded from holding senior governmental positions. The platform is unclear on several issues, including equality of political rights, legal areas that are improperly aligned with Islamic law and the necessity of maintaining a democratic system. Several MB leaders publicly questioned the need for a council of religious scholars and restrictions on women and non-Muslims, indicating that these issues are under debate. The MB apparently has not finalized the platform. In the post-revolutionary period, the MB has played a constructive role, focusing on putting in place the basic requirements for a competitive electoral system. Its leaders have indicated that it will neither field candidates for the presidential election nor seek a majority of parliamentary seats.

Egypt is enjoying a rare period of consensus between secular and Islamist groups. Egyptian military leaders, political actors, civil society groups and religious leaders should use this time to assure that the future debate on the secular or religious nature of the state takes place with maximum citizen participation and with accepted, legitimate rules on decision-making.  The international donor community may be useful in sharing lessons learned from other countries that have gone through similar transitions.

Rick Gold

Cross-posted in Secular Perspectives

Mubarak's Exit and Foreign Intervention

Mubarak finally is history, and the Egyptian people have overcome fear and lies to remove him. They overcame the fear of State Security, who were omnipresent and repressive. They overcame the fear of the National Democratic Party-hired thugs, petty criminals and gang members who beat up political opponents. They overcame the fear of supporting alternatives to Mubarak and the NDP, such as opposition political parties or the Muslim Brotherhood.  Finally, they overcame the fear of a future without Mubarak.

The big lie was that a repressive state apparatus under Mubarak was the only choice for the Egyptian people. Another lie was that a constant state of emergency was required to deal with the threat of terrorism. Egyptians also overcame Mubarak's lie that they were not ready or capable of participating in free and fair elections.

One lie the people have had difficulty counteracting is the Government's condemnation of support by foreign groups or countries for democracy initiatives in Egypt. This lie has been used frequently by Mubarak to repress activists and civil society groups working for political reform. He even used this canard in his last speech on February 10, in which he refused to resign. This time, no one listened, because Egyptians knew in their hearts that they were taking full responsibility for bringing Mubarak down.

Fear of foreign intervention is in fact justified, since the country was under foreign control for two millennia. Egyptians took their fate in their hands in the 1920's, with the creation of the Wafd Party and Muslim Brotherhood, both focused on purging the country of foreign influences and British control. Following the military revolt against the monarchy in 1952, President Gamal Abdel Nasser made many Egyptians proud of his anti-imperialist policies, nationalist views, 1956 seizure of the Suez Canal and 1967 attack on Israel.  Although Nasser lost the Sinai to Israel, he is still viewed as a great leader because of his efforts to build Egypt's strength and leadership of the Arab world. One of the major opposition parties today follows Nasserism.

The Soviet Union strongly supported Nasser and bankrolled the Aswan High Dam. Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, expelled Soviet military advisers, led Egypt to fight the 1973 war with Israel and allied with the US to sign the Camp David Accords with Israel.  Many Egyptians believed that the peace treaty was a betrayal of Nasser's nationalist and pan-Arab ideals. Even though Egypt received about 70 billion dollars in military and economic assistance from the US in support of the Accords, its leaders frequently accused America of intervening in its internal affairs. Egyptian Government officials accused American technicians of imposing themselves and their programs on their Egyptian colleagues.

Mubarak tried to find a balance between accepting US assistance for Egypt's support of the Camp David Accords and exercising complete control of Egypt's political life.  Through his officials and government-controlled media, he frequently criticized the Bush Administration's calls for political reform and support for democracy and civil society. The government put strict controls on foreign funding of civil society organizations.

The Mubarak regime was successful in making criticism of foreign intervention politically correct.  Even some political reform activists whose organizations received USAID and State Department support felt it necessary to make public statements against US democracy programs.  Some newspapers, including those supported by the Government and those in opposition, ran long-term campaigns against democracy assistance, publishing frequent commentary condemning such assistance.

In the post-Mubarak period, with many of the fears overcome and lies dispelled, the Egyptian people need to analyze the new opportunities and constraints of their political environment.  They need to define their long-term interests and identify their capacity for putting in place the legal framework and democratic institutions they need, as well as the areas where support from international donors will be necessary. Egyptians and the international community must work together to build partnerships that strengthen the democratic system and respect the interests of the Egyptian people.

Rick Gold

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The Muslim Brotherhood's Election Prospects

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB), while not a political party, is still the most important political actor outside of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).  Paradoxically, as a banned group, the MB has more freedom to operate than approved political parties, which suffer from both legal and security restrictions.  It is allowed to maintain a physical headquarters, a presence on the web (the English site is http://www.ikhwanweb.com) and representation in unions and school boards. It has fielded candidates for Parliamentary elections, running as independents or in alliance with other parties.  Nevertheless, the Mubarak regime frequently cracks down on MB activists, arresting and torturing them by the hundreds.  The MB has cultivated a reputation of integrity, while the NDP has developed an image of corruption and abuse of power.

Popular support for the MB is high, in the absence of viable political parties.  In the 2005 parliamentary elections, when President Mubarak allowed the MB to campaign as independents, Egyptians voted overwhelmingly for MB candidates in the first of three rounds of voting.  Fearing a complete rout by the MB candidates, State Security and National Police blocked access to polling stations and even shot at Egyptians trying to get into them. Nevertheless, the MB won 20% of the seats of the lower house of Parliament, a total of 88 seats.

Learning from these elections, the Mubarak regime put in place new restrictions that prevented the MB from winning any seats in the upper house of Parliament in 2006. The MB also was prevented from registering almost all of their candidates in the local elections in 2008. In the 2010 Parliamentary elections, the MB participated in the first round. Clearly documented election rigging prevented them from winning any seats.  They withdrew from the second round, but still managed to win one seat. The NDP, on the other hand, increased their seats from 330 to 420, with many of the 68 independents also expected to join the NDP bloc. The opposition parties, including the MB, won a total of 10 seats.

In my opinion, the MB's success in the 2005 elections was an underestimation of its electoral support at that time.  First, it purposefully chose to run candidates in only a third of Egypt's electoral districts, to avoid gaining a Parliamentary majority. Second, the repression of voters during the second and third rounds prevented the MB from gaining additional seats.  The Brotherhood's conservative approach to electoral politics also is reflected in its decision not to participate in the 2011 Presidential elections.

The MB's showing in the 2010 elections does not reflect how well it would perform in free and fair Parliamentary elections. I have emphasized in previous posts that the approved opposition parties, including the NDP and the other major parties, will require months if not years before they develop into modern political parties. The MB, on the other hand, has the organizational, technological and political expertise to run successful campaigns throughout Egypt now. I BELIEVE THAT IF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS WERE HELD BEFORE 2012, THE MB WOULD WIN  DECISIVELY.

Egypt clearly needs time to develop a mature political party culture. If elections were organized before 2012, the Government could not assure that they would be free and fair or that political parties have the capacity to run well-organized campaigns.  Those negotiating Egypt's future after Mubarak leaves the scene should keep in mind the time required for political parties to be ready to compete fairly, so as not to give the MB an undue advantage.

Rick Gold

The Revolution's Significance for Political Parties

The complete control of Egypt's political system by President Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP), combined with its monopoly on access to government resources, has prevented the development of viable opposition parties and facilitated the growth of an authoritarian regime. None of Egypt's 24 approved political parties nor its many unapproved political movements could be considered true political parties, according to international standards. The NDP is no more than a patronage organization that buys votes, either by providing citizens with government-funded social services prior to elections or actually paying them to vote NDP.

The 24 approved political parties do not offer citizens a legitimate means of political expression, nor do they engage in serious competition and dialogue. The five major approved parties neither represent citizen interests nor promote long-term citizen involvement in the electoral system.  They also do not use modern methods of governance or of selecting candidates. They have limited outreach at regional and local levels.  Some of these parties have boycotted multiple elections, which they knew were rigged.

The NDP has used constitutional provisions, laws, policies and administrative practices to stifle any true partisan political competition.  When I was living in Egypt in 2005, President Mubarak, the NDP leader, jailed the leader of the newly approved Al Ghad (Tomorrow) Party, Ayman Nour, after he had come in second in the Presidential elections.  Questionable schisms within the Al Ghad and Wafd Parties appeared to have been fomented by the NDP, in collaboration with State Security.

The NDP exercises effective control of the Political Party Affairs Committee, which has the authority to approve political parties. While the Committee has approved seven parties within the last six years, it has frozen some parties and denied or delayed approval to parties representing secular, Nasserist, and moderate Islamist leanings.  In addition, the Government has banned the Muslim Brotherhood since 1952 and prevented it from organizing a political party. 

In 2005, USAID provided funding to the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute to assess Egyptian political parties and to devise programs for modernizing them on a non-partisan basis. After undertaking assessments of some of the major parties, these Institutes were prevented by the Egyptian Government from registering officially.  The Government "froze" them, neither asking them to leave nor allowing them to undertake activities in Egypt. With these constraints, neither of them could undertake meaningful activities to strengthen the parties within the country. Instead, both of them organized political party training outside Egypt. NDI also made major progress in building the capacity of NGOs to monitor elections.

In post-revolutionary Egypt, if Constitutional, legal and regulatory changes open up the system for truly competitive partisan elections, both existing and new political parties will require time and assistance to develop their potential.  If they are able to access assistance from the donor community, they will still not be ready to compete effectively in the Presidential elections scheduled for September 2011.  They also might not be ready to compete with the Muslim Brotherhood for many years, if it is permitted to establish a party or field candidates.

Donor assistance for political parties, which would be required over many years, should focus on organizational development, electoral development and party governance. Implementers of such programs would need to build skills in the following areas: strategic planning; research; party building; professionalization; organizational management; building local organizations; fundraising and financial management; developing agendas and platforms; recruiting, managing and retaining members and volunteers; media communications; outreach; voter mobilization; running campaigns; recruiting and training candidates; canvassing voters; targeting women, youth and the disadvantaged; improving party governance; building a loyal opposition, and managing power. 

This vast effort would entail a long effort and a sustained commitment by the international community.  It also would require being responsive to the expressed needs of the political parties, rather than imposing a standard package of assistance. Regardless of how long it takes for parties to develop, it is clear that they will operate in an environment of freedom that has not been seen in Egypt for over sixty years. 

Rick Gold

The Quality of Egypt's Democratic Institutions

Much of the efforts by Egyptian civil society, human rights and political reform organizations were directed toward asserting rights in an oppressive political system. Activities, such as civic education, voter registration, increasing the participation of women in political campaigns, building political parties and strengthening civil society's oversight of the government and security sector, were in many ways premature.  They assumed that Egypt's democratic institutions were transparent, responsive and accountable.  This assumption was invalid.

The current Egyptian Constitution, put in place in 1971 by President Sadat, facilitated the rise of a regime that used Egyptian institutions and government resources to assure its survival. Under the 1980 amendment, Islamic law (Sharia) became the principal source of legislative rules. After the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, President Mubarak used the control of the Parliament by his political party, the National Democratic Party (NDP) to repeatedly declare a state of emergency, which continues until this day. The state of emergency removes citizens' protections and provides the military and state security with the legitimate authority to abuse rights and freedoms.  Consequently, these entities, along with the national police, view their mandate as protecting the Mubarak regime, rather than the citizens or the state.

Constitutional amendments in 2005 and 2007 provided a veneer of political reform, including allowing elections of the President for the first time.  However, the restrictions on eligibility for presidential candidates were so tight that only President Mubarak's party will be eligible to nominate a candidate for the planned September 2011 elections. The Constitution does not contain term limits for the presidency, which has allowed President Mubarak to stay in office for thirty years.

Many Egyptian bureaucrats were given large discretion over government resources, but received low salaries. The result was extensive and systemic corruption, which allowed abuses by the elite, harassment of women and the poor and enrichment of senior government officials. Citizens receive inadequate or poor quality social services, such as education and health.  Few mechanisms existed for citizens to provide feedback to government officials. The Muslim Brotherhood filled this vacuum by providing citizens with the social services they needed.

Despite regular elections, the NDP, has been able to gain control of the Parliament either by itself or in coalition with other parties.  The NDP has been given the authority to approve or disapprove new parties.  By using governmental resources to reward its supporters and punish its opponents, the NDP has prevented its opponents from gaining power.  Strong partisan political leaders, such as Ayman Nour, have been imprisoned on trumped-up charges.  Consequently, no true political parties exist today.

The Parliament is under the complete control of the NDP.  It operates as a rubber stamp for the legislation and budget bills submitted by the Government. In the 2005 Parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood won 20% of the seats of the lower house. While its members were able to raise issues, they were not in a position to influence the legislative agenda. Parliament rarely exercises its authority to provide oversight of government operations.

The justice system is the least discredited Egyptian institution. Judges are well trained and more conscientious than bureaucrats about pursuing the public interest. Through the Council of State, the judiciary can condemn and penalize the government for its actions. During elections, citizens trust them to resolve problems at voting stations. Yet corruption tempts judges and court administrators. In some cases, government officials can influence the outcome of cases.

As Egypt enters a post-revolutionary period, the Egyptian people will  need to take on a role not only of holding government accountable, but also of overseeing the complete restructuring of Egypt's Constitution, legal framework and democratic institutions. They will require strong support by the international community as they attempt to accomplish this decades-long set of tasks.

Common Interests and Natural Divisions within Civil Society

Civil society groups familiar to international donors are a small percentage of those fighting for political reform and a post-revolutionary Egypt.  Egypt has a tremendous diversity of non-governmental actors, including service-oriented community groups, non-governmental organizations, private sector associations, religious organizations, labor movements, media and political parties.  While the vast majority of these organizations never took a position regarding political reform, all of them were forced to deal with State Security and other governmental bodies to assure their survival. They therefore had a certain degree of political awareness and an understanding of the efforts of the Mubarak regime to control all aspects of society.  Some analysts have called this phenomenon "black hole government," in which governments let no aspect of social or political life escape their control.

In reality, the Mubarak regime only exercised control over civil society groups sporadically, when it wished to make a political statement. Most of the time, it chose not to use constitutional and legal tools of repression. Consequently, many groups took advantage of the periods when the government was not paying attention to them. For example, the anti-Mubarak group Kifaya (Enough), or the Egyptian Movement for Change, formed in 2004 during a period when the Mubarak regime was using "window-dressing" to make the Bush Administration believe it was truly committed to political reform. Under the banner of opposition to Mubarak, Kifaya brought together groups with conflicting ideologies and visions, such as secularists and Islamists.  Kifaya organized many demonstrations calling for lifting the emergency laws in place since 1981, removing restrictions on forming political parties and newspapers, and  releasing thousands of political prisoners. From 2004-2007, other professional and demographic groups organized resistance against Mubarak, including teachers, students, women, lawyers, journalists and even judges. They were joined in the last three years by wildcat strikers, who refused to abide by government control of their labor unions and syndicates.  Journalists and editors were arrested or fined for writing articles that were judged too critical of Mubarak.

These broad coalitions were able to identify the lowest common denominator among the interests of their members, such as moving toward free elections, reforming the constitution, lifting emergency laws and freeing political prisoners. They recognized that these objectives were more urgent than advancing such goals as strengthening a secular form of governance, moving the legal system toward Sharia or extending civil liberties to Coptic Christians.  Secular groups and the Muslim Brotherhood found common cause in opposing Mubarak, similar to the center, left and communist parties who formed popular fronts in Europe and the US in the 1930's.

Such alliances will be hard to maintain after the fall of Mubarak.  With effort, their constituent groups will maintain enough cohesion to push through the Constitutional and legal changes required to create the democratic institutions needed to mediate their conflicting interests. Unless the Presidential elections scheduled for September 2011 are postponed, however, these alliances have a strong chance of being short-lived.

Rick Gold

USAID support to Egyptian Human Rights and Political Reform Groups

To gain insight into the anti-Mubarak movement, it is important to understand the type of support some of the key civil society organizations received from donors.  The democracy grants issued by USAID from 2005 through 2009 built the capacity of these organizations.  The major issue we confronted was whether to confine our funding to those non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that were registered with the Ministry of Social Solidarity.  Such organizations, even those dedicated to human rights, operated under severe restrictions and were under the complete control of State Security.  On the other hand, it also was possible to provide grants to "civil companies," which were registered as private companies with a social purpose.  While these companies were required to coordinate informally with State Security, they operated with much more freedom than NGOs. 

USAID funded both types of organizations during this period.  In response to strong pressure from the Mubarak regime against funding civil companies, USAID restricted its funding to legally registered NGOs beginning in about 2009.  The human rights organizations funded by USAID after 2009 operated with less freedom and closer oversight from the State Security apparatus.

From 2005-2009, USAID approved over 50 grants valued at over $40 million. Egyptian NGOs included:

• Alliance for Arab Women
• Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services (CEOSS)
• New Horizons
• Environmental Quality International
• South Egypt Development Association at Qena
• Kanater
• BWADI
• GAYD
• Egyptian NGO Support Center
• Association for the Development of Education
• El Nakib Center

Some of the civil companies and law firms included:

• Arab Penal Reform Organization
• Andalus Institute
• United Group
• Ibn Khaldun Center
• Afro-Egyptian Human Rights Organization
• One World Foundation
• Maat

Other grants went to American or international organizations that partnered with Egyptian organizations, including:

• CEDPA
• Internews
• National Democratic Institute
• International Republican Institute
• International Foundation for Electoral Systems
• American Bar Association 
• America's Development Foundation
• Freedom House

The grants funded a wide range of activities, including:

• election monitoring;
• promoting political engagement of youth, women, and the disabled;
• using the media for civic education;
• defending journalists;
• promoting freedom of information;
• providing legal assistance to the poor and vulnerable;
• cultivating human rights activists;
• strengthening civil society oversight of government;
• increasing participation in local decision-making; and
• building a human rights culture.

USAID examined the management controls of each organization receiving funding and provided assistance to strengthen these controls.  Consequently, the management skills and systems of these human rights organizations improved, making them eligible for larger grants from multiple donors.

USAID grants to human rights and political reform organizations helped them to undertake activities to expand rights and build citizen support for democracy.  More importantly, the grants also strengthened the capacity of these organizations to undertake the long struggle necessary to build a movement with enough cohesion to remove Mubarak from office.  As Egypt moves into a post-revolutionary environment, its success in putting in place viable democratic institutions will depend upon the capacity of Egyptian civil society organizations to play their role. It is essential that they focus on building their capacity as they take on increased responsibility to lead Egypt into the future. USAID and other donors should undertake a major initiative to build politically engaged civil society, regardless of the registration status of these organizations.

Rick Gold

Adding Context to the Discussion on Egypt's future

We know that President Mubarak will soon be history. And we know that civil society groups will be responsible for his ouster.  While much of the discussion by bloggers and the formal media have focused on the anti-Mubarak and pro-Mubarak factions, we have heard little about the organizers of the marches and demonstrations.  We have seen little analysis of the strength of the human rights organizations and political reform groups, how they have built their capacity and what role they might play in post-revolutionary Egypt.

I intend to add this missing dimension of the analysis of today's events and prognosis for the future.  From 2004-2007, I oversaw USAID's portfolio of democracy programs in Egypt.  Many of these programs were designed and implemented by Egyptian organizations, and USAID funded them despite tremendous hostility from the Egyptian Government and the state-financed media.  My experience with hundreds of Egyptian organizations has given me some insight into the political environment that kept them weak and divided and delayed the development of the political movement that is unseating Mubarak. 

I want to emphasize that we are witnessing the struggle of the Egyptian people, and that any efforts by donors such as USAID to strengthen civil society groups and democratic institutions were intended to enable these groups to build a movement that reflected their own values and interests. What we are seeing today is the recognition that all of these groups have one common interest - removing Mubarak.  I hope to identify where their interests diverge and how that might influence the formation of coalitions that cooperate and compete for power, in a post-Mubarak Egypt. 
Rick Gold