Moving Toward a Civilian-led Egyptian Government

Many Egyptians, despite having great pride in the armed forces, dream of the day when the military no longer rules society.  To do so, they must build the power of civilian authorities to exercise control over the military. To begin this process, they must put in place a constitution that institutionalizes democracy, assures the rights of minorities and guarantees civilian control of the military.

The revolution, which was sparked by Egyptian youth, led the military to play a more overt role in governing Egypt.  In fact, the military had been in control of the country since it took power from the monarchy in 1952. Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak all came from the military, and many Government leaders either had military backgrounds or were selected by the military.

Most Egyptians have faith that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) will facilitate the election of a new parliament and president.  Such faith is not based on modern Egyptian history, however. Egyptians believed that the military would cede power to a civilian government in 1952, but Nasser took power instead.  This time, the military is more likely to step aside, for two important reasons:

1. It has built its power through control of major parts of the economy, including industry and land, so it has little need to control government directly as well.

2. Through its massive military assistance program, the US Government has trained many leaders to understand the role of the military in a democratic society. Some Egyptians believe that the US pressured the Egyptian military into removing Mubarak and pledging to transfer power to a civilian government.

The underpinning of any modern state is its constitution or set of basic laws.  Egypt has had many constitutions over the last 150 years. The importance of constitutions has been diminished in the last 60 years due to extensive periods of time under emergency law, when many constitutional rights were set aside. Nevertheless, Egypt can only begin the transition to a civilian-led state by putting into place a new or significantly amended constitution.  Moreover, Egyptians must make sustained efforts to enforce and defend their constitution.

Constitutions represent the vision of a people for their society, state and government.  So far, Egyptians have been unable to begin the debate that leads to a common vision. Instead, they have paid more attention to casting off the baggage from the past.  After the departure of Mubarak, the Coalition of Revolutionary Youth negotiated, both around the table and at Tahrir Square, a set of demands. These demands included cancellation of the state of emergency; release of political prisoners; cancellation of the constitution; dissolution of the parliament and local popular councils; dissolution of the ruling National Democratic Party and State Security; and enforcement of judicial decisions. The Youth demanded a transitional presidential council with civil and military representatives and a credible transitional government prior to parliamentary and presidential elections. During the transition period, they expected greater freedom for political parties, stronger political rights and increased freedom of association. These rights would be enshrined in a new constitution that reduces the powers of the President, strengthens separation of power and increases the fairness of elections.
 
The SCAF, demonstrating its interest in expediting the transfer of power to an elected government, appointed a commission to propose constitutional amendments that would allow an early election of a parliament and president.  In a major break from the past, it included a Muslim Brotherhood leader in the committee. The committee proposed eight amendments, and the SCAF gave the population only three weeks to review them before voting them up or down in a referendum. 
 
The amendments made it more difficult to proclaim and maintain a state of emergency, limited the presidency to at most two four-year terms, required that "he" not be married to a non-Egyptian, strengthened judicial supervision of elections, required the president to appoint a deputy, provided easier access to presidential elections by candidates and established a commission to draft a new constitution following the parliamentary election.

Egyptians did not take advantage of the review period to analyze and debate the implications of each of the amendments.  Instead, they divided into pro- and anti-camps, based on whether they saw the referendum as increasing or hurting their chances of winning the parliamentary and presidential elections.  The revolutionary youth, the Coptic Church and many civil society groups led a campaign to vote no, based on the weakness of checks on executive authority and the fear that the Muslim Brotherhood or remnants of the National Democratic Party would win early elections. The MB and the NDP were successful in gaining the support of the population for early elections, as the referendum was approved by 77% of the 18.3 million valid votes. 

The SCAF has set parliamentary elections for September 2011 and presidential elections for November 2011, although these dates are not fixed. According to one of the approved constitutional amendments, the president and parliament will appoint a 100-member constituent assembly within six months of elections to rewrite the constitution over the course of a subsequent six-month period, which would be approved or disapproved through a referendum.

It is essential now for Egyptians to begin the profound public debate about the type of post-revolutionary society, state and government they envision and how a new constitution would enable them to achieve these goals.  Such a task is difficult, given the need to also deal with the past, develop political parties and put in place the rules and safeguards for free and fair elections.  However, delaying such a discussion will empower those forces already dominating society, such as the military, the remnants of state security, the Muslim Brotherhood, elite businesspeople and remnants of the National Democratic Party.  The solidarity among groups that participated in the Tahrir Square uprising must be maintained for Egyptians to see their common interest in putting in place a constitution that establishes a civilian led-government, provides civilian oversight of the military and other components of the security sector, provides checks and balances among democratic institutions and safeguards the interests of minorities. The constitutional debate must start now and must empower Egyptians to put in place the systems that enable groups, ideas and values to compete fairly for power. 

Rick Gold

Cross-posted in Secular Perspectives

The Muslim Brotherhood's Election Prospects

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB), while not a political party, is still the most important political actor outside of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).  Paradoxically, as a banned group, the MB has more freedom to operate than approved political parties, which suffer from both legal and security restrictions.  It is allowed to maintain a physical headquarters, a presence on the web (the English site is http://www.ikhwanweb.com) and representation in unions and school boards. It has fielded candidates for Parliamentary elections, running as independents or in alliance with other parties.  Nevertheless, the Mubarak regime frequently cracks down on MB activists, arresting and torturing them by the hundreds.  The MB has cultivated a reputation of integrity, while the NDP has developed an image of corruption and abuse of power.

Popular support for the MB is high, in the absence of viable political parties.  In the 2005 parliamentary elections, when President Mubarak allowed the MB to campaign as independents, Egyptians voted overwhelmingly for MB candidates in the first of three rounds of voting.  Fearing a complete rout by the MB candidates, State Security and National Police blocked access to polling stations and even shot at Egyptians trying to get into them. Nevertheless, the MB won 20% of the seats of the lower house of Parliament, a total of 88 seats.

Learning from these elections, the Mubarak regime put in place new restrictions that prevented the MB from winning any seats in the upper house of Parliament in 2006. The MB also was prevented from registering almost all of their candidates in the local elections in 2008. In the 2010 Parliamentary elections, the MB participated in the first round. Clearly documented election rigging prevented them from winning any seats.  They withdrew from the second round, but still managed to win one seat. The NDP, on the other hand, increased their seats from 330 to 420, with many of the 68 independents also expected to join the NDP bloc. The opposition parties, including the MB, won a total of 10 seats.

In my opinion, the MB's success in the 2005 elections was an underestimation of its electoral support at that time.  First, it purposefully chose to run candidates in only a third of Egypt's electoral districts, to avoid gaining a Parliamentary majority. Second, the repression of voters during the second and third rounds prevented the MB from gaining additional seats.  The Brotherhood's conservative approach to electoral politics also is reflected in its decision not to participate in the 2011 Presidential elections.

The MB's showing in the 2010 elections does not reflect how well it would perform in free and fair Parliamentary elections. I have emphasized in previous posts that the approved opposition parties, including the NDP and the other major parties, will require months if not years before they develop into modern political parties. The MB, on the other hand, has the organizational, technological and political expertise to run successful campaigns throughout Egypt now. I BELIEVE THAT IF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS WERE HELD BEFORE 2012, THE MB WOULD WIN  DECISIVELY.

Egypt clearly needs time to develop a mature political party culture. If elections were organized before 2012, the Government could not assure that they would be free and fair or that political parties have the capacity to run well-organized campaigns.  Those negotiating Egypt's future after Mubarak leaves the scene should keep in mind the time required for political parties to be ready to compete fairly, so as not to give the MB an undue advantage.

Rick Gold

The Revolution's Significance for Political Parties

The complete control of Egypt's political system by President Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP), combined with its monopoly on access to government resources, has prevented the development of viable opposition parties and facilitated the growth of an authoritarian regime. None of Egypt's 24 approved political parties nor its many unapproved political movements could be considered true political parties, according to international standards. The NDP is no more than a patronage organization that buys votes, either by providing citizens with government-funded social services prior to elections or actually paying them to vote NDP.

The 24 approved political parties do not offer citizens a legitimate means of political expression, nor do they engage in serious competition and dialogue. The five major approved parties neither represent citizen interests nor promote long-term citizen involvement in the electoral system.  They also do not use modern methods of governance or of selecting candidates. They have limited outreach at regional and local levels.  Some of these parties have boycotted multiple elections, which they knew were rigged.

The NDP has used constitutional provisions, laws, policies and administrative practices to stifle any true partisan political competition.  When I was living in Egypt in 2005, President Mubarak, the NDP leader, jailed the leader of the newly approved Al Ghad (Tomorrow) Party, Ayman Nour, after he had come in second in the Presidential elections.  Questionable schisms within the Al Ghad and Wafd Parties appeared to have been fomented by the NDP, in collaboration with State Security.

The NDP exercises effective control of the Political Party Affairs Committee, which has the authority to approve political parties. While the Committee has approved seven parties within the last six years, it has frozen some parties and denied or delayed approval to parties representing secular, Nasserist, and moderate Islamist leanings.  In addition, the Government has banned the Muslim Brotherhood since 1952 and prevented it from organizing a political party. 

In 2005, USAID provided funding to the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute to assess Egyptian political parties and to devise programs for modernizing them on a non-partisan basis. After undertaking assessments of some of the major parties, these Institutes were prevented by the Egyptian Government from registering officially.  The Government "froze" them, neither asking them to leave nor allowing them to undertake activities in Egypt. With these constraints, neither of them could undertake meaningful activities to strengthen the parties within the country. Instead, both of them organized political party training outside Egypt. NDI also made major progress in building the capacity of NGOs to monitor elections.

In post-revolutionary Egypt, if Constitutional, legal and regulatory changes open up the system for truly competitive partisan elections, both existing and new political parties will require time and assistance to develop their potential.  If they are able to access assistance from the donor community, they will still not be ready to compete effectively in the Presidential elections scheduled for September 2011.  They also might not be ready to compete with the Muslim Brotherhood for many years, if it is permitted to establish a party or field candidates.

Donor assistance for political parties, which would be required over many years, should focus on organizational development, electoral development and party governance. Implementers of such programs would need to build skills in the following areas: strategic planning; research; party building; professionalization; organizational management; building local organizations; fundraising and financial management; developing agendas and platforms; recruiting, managing and retaining members and volunteers; media communications; outreach; voter mobilization; running campaigns; recruiting and training candidates; canvassing voters; targeting women, youth and the disadvantaged; improving party governance; building a loyal opposition, and managing power. 

This vast effort would entail a long effort and a sustained commitment by the international community.  It also would require being responsive to the expressed needs of the political parties, rather than imposing a standard package of assistance. Regardless of how long it takes for parties to develop, it is clear that they will operate in an environment of freedom that has not been seen in Egypt for over sixty years. 

Rick Gold

The Quality of Egypt's Democratic Institutions

Much of the efforts by Egyptian civil society, human rights and political reform organizations were directed toward asserting rights in an oppressive political system. Activities, such as civic education, voter registration, increasing the participation of women in political campaigns, building political parties and strengthening civil society's oversight of the government and security sector, were in many ways premature.  They assumed that Egypt's democratic institutions were transparent, responsive and accountable.  This assumption was invalid.

The current Egyptian Constitution, put in place in 1971 by President Sadat, facilitated the rise of a regime that used Egyptian institutions and government resources to assure its survival. Under the 1980 amendment, Islamic law (Sharia) became the principal source of legislative rules. After the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, President Mubarak used the control of the Parliament by his political party, the National Democratic Party (NDP) to repeatedly declare a state of emergency, which continues until this day. The state of emergency removes citizens' protections and provides the military and state security with the legitimate authority to abuse rights and freedoms.  Consequently, these entities, along with the national police, view their mandate as protecting the Mubarak regime, rather than the citizens or the state.

Constitutional amendments in 2005 and 2007 provided a veneer of political reform, including allowing elections of the President for the first time.  However, the restrictions on eligibility for presidential candidates were so tight that only President Mubarak's party will be eligible to nominate a candidate for the planned September 2011 elections. The Constitution does not contain term limits for the presidency, which has allowed President Mubarak to stay in office for thirty years.

Many Egyptian bureaucrats were given large discretion over government resources, but received low salaries. The result was extensive and systemic corruption, which allowed abuses by the elite, harassment of women and the poor and enrichment of senior government officials. Citizens receive inadequate or poor quality social services, such as education and health.  Few mechanisms existed for citizens to provide feedback to government officials. The Muslim Brotherhood filled this vacuum by providing citizens with the social services they needed.

Despite regular elections, the NDP, has been able to gain control of the Parliament either by itself or in coalition with other parties.  The NDP has been given the authority to approve or disapprove new parties.  By using governmental resources to reward its supporters and punish its opponents, the NDP has prevented its opponents from gaining power.  Strong partisan political leaders, such as Ayman Nour, have been imprisoned on trumped-up charges.  Consequently, no true political parties exist today.

The Parliament is under the complete control of the NDP.  It operates as a rubber stamp for the legislation and budget bills submitted by the Government. In the 2005 Parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood won 20% of the seats of the lower house. While its members were able to raise issues, they were not in a position to influence the legislative agenda. Parliament rarely exercises its authority to provide oversight of government operations.

The justice system is the least discredited Egyptian institution. Judges are well trained and more conscientious than bureaucrats about pursuing the public interest. Through the Council of State, the judiciary can condemn and penalize the government for its actions. During elections, citizens trust them to resolve problems at voting stations. Yet corruption tempts judges and court administrators. In some cases, government officials can influence the outcome of cases.

As Egypt enters a post-revolutionary period, the Egyptian people will  need to take on a role not only of holding government accountable, but also of overseeing the complete restructuring of Egypt's Constitution, legal framework and democratic institutions. They will require strong support by the international community as they attempt to accomplish this decades-long set of tasks.