Egypt, Palestinian Rights and the Camp David Accords – Part 1

September 2011 Attack on the Israeli Embassy in Cairo

Many non-Egyptians fear that the revolution will lead to war with Israel in support of a Palestinian state. Some say that a stronger role for the Muslim Brotherhood in Parliament will lead to abrogation of the 1978 Camp David accords and the 1979 treaty with Israel.  From my understanding of Egyptian history and culture and multiple visits since February 2011, I am convinced that war is not imminent and that the accords and treaty will be respected. However, Egypt will become a more active player in the efforts to establish a Palestine state.  Such a role will grow out of the efforts of Egyptians to establish a separation of powers among democratic institutions, civilian control of the military and transitional justice.

Until recently, analysts have considered the decisions of Egyptian leaders to be the most important factor in the country’s relations with Israel, Palestine and other Arab countries.  Today, Egypt’s engagement on Middle East political issues is more dependent on the establishment of its own responsive democratic institutions, modern political parties and effective advocacy groups.  Voices suppressed for decades are now in a position to influence government policy.  At the same time, the power of the military to influence foreign policy has become more overt.  Revolutionary groups have become important players in both domestic and foreign policy.

The interplay of these forces will lead to changes in Egypt’s role in the Middle East.  It is impossible to predict exactly what positions or actions the Egyptian Government will take.  We can be sure, however, that its actions vis-a-vis Israel and Palestine will correspond more closely to the desires of the Egyptian population.

To appreciate the factors that will influence Egypt’s Middle East policy, it is important to understand modern Egyptian history and the relationship between its leaders and people. I will present an overview of the events that have shaped Egyptians' feelings on Israel and Palestinian rights in three blog posts. This post traces Egypt’s history from the Ottoman Empire until Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War with Israel.

The Ottoman Empire

Egypt and Palestine were part of the Ottoman Empire for hundreds of years. In 1882, the British occupied Egypt.  While many Egyptians objected to Ottoman control of Egypt, they were pleased that the Ottomans, a Muslim but non-Arab people, controlled Jerusalem.  British colonialism was strongly opposed by Egyptians, especially after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire following World War I and the creation of the British mandate for Palestine in 1922.

British Control, Liberal Democracy and the Monarchy

Saad Zaghlul, Founder of the Wafd Party and First Prime Minister of Independent Egypt

Three of the ideologies that influence post-revolutionary Egypt and its role in the Middle East were forged during the British occupation – liberal nationalist, communist and Islamist.  Opposition to British control in Palestine led Palestinians to revolt in 1920, 1929 and 1936. In Egypt, the British allowed the development of a liberal democracy based on a modern constitution, with an effective Parliament and active political parties. Nationalists in Egypt led uprisings in 1919 and 1921, which forced the British to formally recognize the independence of Egypt under King Fuad, with nationalist leader Saad Zaghlul as Prime Minister.  However, the British continued to occupy Egypt and interfere with its governance. Communists and the Muslim Brotherhood competed with liberal nationalists in opposing the British.  Some of them joined with Arab nationalists in Palestine to support the 1941-42 drive across North Africa led by Nazi General Rommel, which was eventually stopped by the British General Montgomery in November 1942.

The 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Creation of Israel and Palestinian Displacement

May 1948 Israeli Declaration of Independence and Beginning of Arab-Israeli War

Both Egyptian leaders and citizens showed solidarity with the Arabs of Palestine during the 1947 Partition, the1948 Arab-Israeli war, the creation of the state of Israel and the displacement of Palestinians from their lands. The Egyptians, under King Farouk, Fuad’s successor, and the nationalist-dominated Parliament rejected the 1947 UN Partition Plan for Palestine and sent 20,000 troops to join other Arab League members fighting in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Farouk saw this war as a means to build Egypt’s leadership of the Arab world and a way of extending Egypt’s authority to southern Palestine. The 1949 armistice gave the Gaza Strip to Egypt.

The creation of the State of Israel and the annexation of the West Bank and Jerusalem by Jordan were bitter blows to Egyptian leaders, who spent the next eight years in a cold peace with Israel. Egyptian citizens were disappointed in the performance of their military.  In solidarity with other Arabs, Egyptian leaders voiced the sympathy of their citizens for the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees displaced during the war.  

Free Officers Movement, Creation of a Republic Government and the 1956 Suez Crisis

Free Officers Movement, including Nasser and Sadat

A fourth major ideology affecting Egypt’s role in the Middle East today was born in the 1950’s – Nasserism. A coup d’état by the “Free Officers Movement” in 1952 led to the fall of the monarchy, the creation of a republican government in 1953 and the assumption of power by Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954.  In 1956, as the British pulled out of the Suez Canal, their last remaining foothold in Egypt, Nasser nationalized the Canal, and barred Israeli shipping through the Canal as well as through the Straits of Tiran leading to Israel’s port of Eilat.  Israel then invaded and occupied the Sinai.  Britain and France undertook a bombing campaign and sent troops to secure the Suez Canal. Pressure from the US eventually led to withdrawal of these forces and the establishment of UN Peacekeepers in the Sinai, but the Egyptian population was left with a stronger view of Israel as the enemy and greater pride in the Egyptian military.   

 Gamal Abdel Nasser – Arab Nationalism and Repression

Gamal Abdel Nasser

The vast majority of Arabs throughout the Middle East viewed Nasser as a hero.  Most Egyptians were proud of Nasser’s strong Arab nationalistic rhetoric, anti-imperialism, support for revolutionary movements in Algeria and Yemen and vehement opposition to Israel.

Nasser transformed Egypt by investing heavily in infrastructure, building the government bureaucracy and pursuing a significant program of land reform.  His goal was the establishment of a secular, militarized State. However, over the next decade, Nasser created a totalitarian state that gave primacy to the military. He established tight control of the military and intelligence services; abolished all but the ruling political party; led campaigns of severe repression against Islamists, communists, minorities and foreigners; and took total control of the media and national Muslim institutions.  In 1965, he imprisoned and eventually executed Sayyad Qutb, the Muslim Brotherhood’s leading theoretician.  Egyptians showed their support for Nasser in electing him as President in referenda where he was the only candidate.

Consequently, any opposition to Nasser’s intervention in Israel was repressed.  Those voices who opposed or supported another approach to his Israel and Palestine policies, whether communist, Islamist or liberal, were not part of the public discourse.

Creation of the PLO

Nasser Addressing the PLO

To demonstrate his leadership of the Arab world and ability to use Palestinians to pressure Israel, Nasser helped organize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) by passing a resolution at an Arab League summit meeting in Cairo in January 1964.  The founding conference of the PLO took place in Jerusalem in May 1964, resulting in the creation of the Palestinian National Council, serving as the Palestinian parliament-in-exile. It also issued the Palestinian National Charter.  The Charter sought the establishment of a Palestinian state in the place of Israel, affirmed the Palestinians’ right to return and called for armed struggle to liberate Palestine.  It also aimed for the elimination of Zionism, which it called racist, fanatic, aggressive, expansionist, colonialist and fascist. 

Many Egyptians hailed this initiative in support of their Arab brethren and the recuperation of what Nasser called “Arab land.”  As tension mounted with Israel from 1965-1967, the vast majority of Egyptians supported the efforts of Nasser to use the PLO to prepare for the Six-Day War that broke out in June 1967.

The Six-Day War and its Aftermath

Egyptian Soldiers Surrendering to Israelis

Persuaded by a massive domestic public relations campaign of the strength of the Egyptian army, most Egyptians were proud that Nasser had decided to use the military forces again after 11 years for his purpose of recovering “Arab land” from Israel and “restoring the rights of the Palestinian people.”  His first step was to demand the removal of UN troops from the Sinai.  Then, as in 1956, he ordered the military to blockade the Straits of Tiran to prevent shipping to the Israeli port of Eilat. After Nasser massed Egyptian troops in the Sinai, Israel started hostilities on June 5 by bombarding and destroying the Egyptian air force.  Its troops then encircled and bombed the Egyptian army, which performed poorly and was confused by a retreat order. The Israelis took Gaza on June 7 and arrived at the Suez Canal by June 8. The Egyptian army had been defeated, even though most of its units had little chance to fight. Unlike in 1956, Israel remained in control of the Sinai and Gaza after the war, a bitter loss to Egypt.

Nasser was deeply shamed by the poor performance of the Egyptian military and the loss of the Sinai and its oil fields.  Almost all Egyptians were in a state of shock, finding it difficult to believe that Nasser could have led their country into such a cataclysm.  Some of them could no longer view him as a hero and began to think of his Arab nationalist project as a bad dream. Nasser never recovered psychologically and died in 1970.  His Arab nationalist movement died with him, as Egypt increasingly became a militarized police state with an ever-growing bureaucracy.

Nasser did leave a legacy of frustrated and repressed idealists, whether Arab nationalists, liberals, communists, Islamists or those who supported the supremacy of the military.  Each of these groups remained committed to the rights of the Palestinian people, coming from their own ideological perspectives.  The interaction of these groups and their attempts to support the Palestinians provided some of the seeds of the 2011 Egyptian revolution.

Rick Gold

Cross-Posted in Secular Perspectives

Moving Toward a Civilian-led Egyptian Government

Many Egyptians, despite having great pride in the armed forces, dream of the day when the military no longer rules society.  To do so, they must build the power of civilian authorities to exercise control over the military. To begin this process, they must put in place a constitution that institutionalizes democracy, assures the rights of minorities and guarantees civilian control of the military.

The revolution, which was sparked by Egyptian youth, led the military to play a more overt role in governing Egypt.  In fact, the military had been in control of the country since it took power from the monarchy in 1952. Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak all came from the military, and many Government leaders either had military backgrounds or were selected by the military.

Most Egyptians have faith that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) will facilitate the election of a new parliament and president.  Such faith is not based on modern Egyptian history, however. Egyptians believed that the military would cede power to a civilian government in 1952, but Nasser took power instead.  This time, the military is more likely to step aside, for two important reasons:

1. It has built its power through control of major parts of the economy, including industry and land, so it has little need to control government directly as well.

2. Through its massive military assistance program, the US Government has trained many leaders to understand the role of the military in a democratic society. Some Egyptians believe that the US pressured the Egyptian military into removing Mubarak and pledging to transfer power to a civilian government.

The underpinning of any modern state is its constitution or set of basic laws.  Egypt has had many constitutions over the last 150 years. The importance of constitutions has been diminished in the last 60 years due to extensive periods of time under emergency law, when many constitutional rights were set aside. Nevertheless, Egypt can only begin the transition to a civilian-led state by putting into place a new or significantly amended constitution.  Moreover, Egyptians must make sustained efforts to enforce and defend their constitution.

Constitutions represent the vision of a people for their society, state and government.  So far, Egyptians have been unable to begin the debate that leads to a common vision. Instead, they have paid more attention to casting off the baggage from the past.  After the departure of Mubarak, the Coalition of Revolutionary Youth negotiated, both around the table and at Tahrir Square, a set of demands. These demands included cancellation of the state of emergency; release of political prisoners; cancellation of the constitution; dissolution of the parliament and local popular councils; dissolution of the ruling National Democratic Party and State Security; and enforcement of judicial decisions. The Youth demanded a transitional presidential council with civil and military representatives and a credible transitional government prior to parliamentary and presidential elections. During the transition period, they expected greater freedom for political parties, stronger political rights and increased freedom of association. These rights would be enshrined in a new constitution that reduces the powers of the President, strengthens separation of power and increases the fairness of elections.
 
The SCAF, demonstrating its interest in expediting the transfer of power to an elected government, appointed a commission to propose constitutional amendments that would allow an early election of a parliament and president.  In a major break from the past, it included a Muslim Brotherhood leader in the committee. The committee proposed eight amendments, and the SCAF gave the population only three weeks to review them before voting them up or down in a referendum. 
 
The amendments made it more difficult to proclaim and maintain a state of emergency, limited the presidency to at most two four-year terms, required that "he" not be married to a non-Egyptian, strengthened judicial supervision of elections, required the president to appoint a deputy, provided easier access to presidential elections by candidates and established a commission to draft a new constitution following the parliamentary election.

Egyptians did not take advantage of the review period to analyze and debate the implications of each of the amendments.  Instead, they divided into pro- and anti-camps, based on whether they saw the referendum as increasing or hurting their chances of winning the parliamentary and presidential elections.  The revolutionary youth, the Coptic Church and many civil society groups led a campaign to vote no, based on the weakness of checks on executive authority and the fear that the Muslim Brotherhood or remnants of the National Democratic Party would win early elections. The MB and the NDP were successful in gaining the support of the population for early elections, as the referendum was approved by 77% of the 18.3 million valid votes. 

The SCAF has set parliamentary elections for September 2011 and presidential elections for November 2011, although these dates are not fixed. According to one of the approved constitutional amendments, the president and parliament will appoint a 100-member constituent assembly within six months of elections to rewrite the constitution over the course of a subsequent six-month period, which would be approved or disapproved through a referendum.

It is essential now for Egyptians to begin the profound public debate about the type of post-revolutionary society, state and government they envision and how a new constitution would enable them to achieve these goals.  Such a task is difficult, given the need to also deal with the past, develop political parties and put in place the rules and safeguards for free and fair elections.  However, delaying such a discussion will empower those forces already dominating society, such as the military, the remnants of state security, the Muslim Brotherhood, elite businesspeople and remnants of the National Democratic Party.  The solidarity among groups that participated in the Tahrir Square uprising must be maintained for Egyptians to see their common interest in putting in place a constitution that establishes a civilian led-government, provides civilian oversight of the military and other components of the security sector, provides checks and balances among democratic institutions and safeguards the interests of minorities. The constitutional debate must start now and must empower Egyptians to put in place the systems that enable groups, ideas and values to compete fairly for power. 

Rick Gold

Cross-posted in Secular Perspectives

The Battle over Egypt's Secular and Muslim Character

One of the major objectives of the Egyptian revolution is to create a system that allows Egyptians to influence decision-making by democratic institutions. Since the 1920's, secular parties and the Muslim Brotherhood have fought over the degree to which the country's Constitution, laws, regulations, and programs reflect a separation or integration of religion and state. From 1923-1980, secularism was the dominant feature of Egyptian Constitutions. However, in 1980, to reduce pressure on the regime from the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic political groups, President Sadat initiated an amendment to Article 2 of the Constitution, which now states, "Principles of Islamic Law (Sharia) are the principal source of legislation."  Egypt, which has a civil law system inspired by France, was subsequently required to verify that laws or draft laws are consistent with Islamic law. In practice, this requirement applied only to personal status laws, dealing with such issues as marriage, divorce, child support and inheritance. Criminal laws, as contained in the Penal Code, have not been reviewed from a perspective of Sharia.

The Constitution contains other references to the Muslim character of the state. Article 2 contains, "Islam is the religion of the state..." Article 19 reads, "Religious education shall be a principal subject in the courses of general education."

These provisions are balanced by statements promoting freedom of religion and opposing discrimination. Article 46 affirms, "The state shall guarantee the freedom of belief and the freedom of practice of religious rites." Article 40 declares, "All citizens are equal before the law. They have equal public rights and duties without discrimination between them due to race, ethnic origin, language, religion or creed."

After the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), fielding candidates running as independents in 2005, won 20% of the seats of the the People's Assembly, President Mubarak in 2007 pushed through an Amendment of Article 5, which forbids using religion in political campaigns. It reads, "Citizens have the right to organize political parties according to the law, and no political activity shall be exercised nor political parties established on the basis of religion or discrimination due to gender or race."  This amendment, reflecting a secular outlook, effectively prohibits the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups from competing in elections.

One of the novelties of the mass movement that unseated Mubarak was that it brought together secularists with Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters.  The unstated implication was that everyone supported removal of the religious restrictions of Article 5, so that the Muslim Brotherhood could participate in elections. Whether the Constitution is amended or replaced, the new language will establish no restrictions on electoral participation by the MB.

The Constitution is the basic law of Egypt, but many of its provisions were inapplicable during the full thirty years of the Mubarak regime, since the country was under a state of emergency. Throughout this time, Mubarak manipulated laws, government, justice institutions and the media to divide Christians and Muslims, discriminate against minorities such as Baha'is, Shias, atheists and homosexuals, and persecute leaders and members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Coptic Christians, who constitute about 10% of the population, were prevented from building and repairing churches, restricted from certain professions and inadequately protected from occasional attacks by thugs. Many Egyptians accuse State Security of organizing attacks on churches and stores owned by Copts.

One set of issues targeted by Egyptian human rights advocates, including the anti-Mubarak group Kifaya, are the obstacles faced by Baha'is, atheists and members of other unofficially recognized religions in gaining identification papers.  ID cards, whether in paper or electronic version, are required for employment, education, banking, owning property, health care, traveling, birth, death, marriage, divorce, and vaccination of children.  The Ministry of Interior required citizens to indicate their religion on the cards, but they were given only three choices: Islam; Christianity; and Judaism.  Unless the 2,000 Baha'is were prepared to lie about their religion, they had difficulty gaining access to these cards. In 2006, the Ministry of Interior asked USAID for assistance in completing distribution of ID cards to several million citizens.  It refused USAID's offer to provide assistance from the US organization IFES to insure that all citizens, including Baha'is, could receive their cards.  Several court cases tested the Government's position on this issue, and Cairo's Court of Administrative Justice ruled in favor of the Baha'is in January 2008. The Ministry of Interior changed its policy to issue the first ID cards, without any religion noted, to two Baha'i teenagers in August 2009.

In February 2011, a constitutional review committee was mandated by the military to draft revisions to several articles. Its mandate does not include articles that define the secular or Muslim character of the state or the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in elections. In defining the tasks of the committee, the military assumed that an elected government would be in a better position to deal with these issues, either through constitutional amendments or by putting in place a new constitution.

Both secular groups and the Muslim Brotherhood are preparing for the inevitable battle over the secular or religious character of the Egyptian state. Secular groups are focusing on these general principles:
1. All Egyptians are born free and equal in dignity and rights
2. All Egyptians have the right of free thought and religion.
3. All Egyptians are equal before the law.
4. Any Egyptian is entitled to all rights and freedoms without distinction such as race, gender, religion or origin.
5. An Egyptian secular (civil) state is the only way to achieve these objectives.

The Muslim Brotherhood released a draft platform in 2007 that attempted to lay out its approach to governance. It included the formation of a council of religious scholars, elected by religious leaders. This council would advise the legislative and executive branches on religious law. Parliamentarians would determine which Islamic teachings are authoritative. The Supreme Constitutional Court would be the final arbiter. Women and non-Muslims would be excluded from holding senior governmental positions. The platform is unclear on several issues, including equality of political rights, legal areas that are improperly aligned with Islamic law and the necessity of maintaining a democratic system. Several MB leaders publicly questioned the need for a council of religious scholars and restrictions on women and non-Muslims, indicating that these issues are under debate. The MB apparently has not finalized the platform. In the post-revolutionary period, the MB has played a constructive role, focusing on putting in place the basic requirements for a competitive electoral system. Its leaders have indicated that it will neither field candidates for the presidential election nor seek a majority of parliamentary seats.

Egypt is enjoying a rare period of consensus between secular and Islamist groups. Egyptian military leaders, political actors, civil society groups and religious leaders should use this time to assure that the future debate on the secular or religious nature of the state takes place with maximum citizen participation and with accepted, legitimate rules on decision-making.  The international donor community may be useful in sharing lessons learned from other countries that have gone through similar transitions.

Rick Gold

Cross-posted in Secular Perspectives

The Muslim Brotherhood's Election Prospects

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB), while not a political party, is still the most important political actor outside of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).  Paradoxically, as a banned group, the MB has more freedom to operate than approved political parties, which suffer from both legal and security restrictions.  It is allowed to maintain a physical headquarters, a presence on the web (the English site is http://www.ikhwanweb.com) and representation in unions and school boards. It has fielded candidates for Parliamentary elections, running as independents or in alliance with other parties.  Nevertheless, the Mubarak regime frequently cracks down on MB activists, arresting and torturing them by the hundreds.  The MB has cultivated a reputation of integrity, while the NDP has developed an image of corruption and abuse of power.

Popular support for the MB is high, in the absence of viable political parties.  In the 2005 parliamentary elections, when President Mubarak allowed the MB to campaign as independents, Egyptians voted overwhelmingly for MB candidates in the first of three rounds of voting.  Fearing a complete rout by the MB candidates, State Security and National Police blocked access to polling stations and even shot at Egyptians trying to get into them. Nevertheless, the MB won 20% of the seats of the lower house of Parliament, a total of 88 seats.

Learning from these elections, the Mubarak regime put in place new restrictions that prevented the MB from winning any seats in the upper house of Parliament in 2006. The MB also was prevented from registering almost all of their candidates in the local elections in 2008. In the 2010 Parliamentary elections, the MB participated in the first round. Clearly documented election rigging prevented them from winning any seats.  They withdrew from the second round, but still managed to win one seat. The NDP, on the other hand, increased their seats from 330 to 420, with many of the 68 independents also expected to join the NDP bloc. The opposition parties, including the MB, won a total of 10 seats.

In my opinion, the MB's success in the 2005 elections was an underestimation of its electoral support at that time.  First, it purposefully chose to run candidates in only a third of Egypt's electoral districts, to avoid gaining a Parliamentary majority. Second, the repression of voters during the second and third rounds prevented the MB from gaining additional seats.  The Brotherhood's conservative approach to electoral politics also is reflected in its decision not to participate in the 2011 Presidential elections.

The MB's showing in the 2010 elections does not reflect how well it would perform in free and fair Parliamentary elections. I have emphasized in previous posts that the approved opposition parties, including the NDP and the other major parties, will require months if not years before they develop into modern political parties. The MB, on the other hand, has the organizational, technological and political expertise to run successful campaigns throughout Egypt now. I BELIEVE THAT IF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS WERE HELD BEFORE 2012, THE MB WOULD WIN  DECISIVELY.

Egypt clearly needs time to develop a mature political party culture. If elections were organized before 2012, the Government could not assure that they would be free and fair or that political parties have the capacity to run well-organized campaigns.  Those negotiating Egypt's future after Mubarak leaves the scene should keep in mind the time required for political parties to be ready to compete fairly, so as not to give the MB an undue advantage.

Rick Gold

The Revolution's Significance for Political Parties

The complete control of Egypt's political system by President Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP), combined with its monopoly on access to government resources, has prevented the development of viable opposition parties and facilitated the growth of an authoritarian regime. None of Egypt's 24 approved political parties nor its many unapproved political movements could be considered true political parties, according to international standards. The NDP is no more than a patronage organization that buys votes, either by providing citizens with government-funded social services prior to elections or actually paying them to vote NDP.

The 24 approved political parties do not offer citizens a legitimate means of political expression, nor do they engage in serious competition and dialogue. The five major approved parties neither represent citizen interests nor promote long-term citizen involvement in the electoral system.  They also do not use modern methods of governance or of selecting candidates. They have limited outreach at regional and local levels.  Some of these parties have boycotted multiple elections, which they knew were rigged.

The NDP has used constitutional provisions, laws, policies and administrative practices to stifle any true partisan political competition.  When I was living in Egypt in 2005, President Mubarak, the NDP leader, jailed the leader of the newly approved Al Ghad (Tomorrow) Party, Ayman Nour, after he had come in second in the Presidential elections.  Questionable schisms within the Al Ghad and Wafd Parties appeared to have been fomented by the NDP, in collaboration with State Security.

The NDP exercises effective control of the Political Party Affairs Committee, which has the authority to approve political parties. While the Committee has approved seven parties within the last six years, it has frozen some parties and denied or delayed approval to parties representing secular, Nasserist, and moderate Islamist leanings.  In addition, the Government has banned the Muslim Brotherhood since 1952 and prevented it from organizing a political party. 

In 2005, USAID provided funding to the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute to assess Egyptian political parties and to devise programs for modernizing them on a non-partisan basis. After undertaking assessments of some of the major parties, these Institutes were prevented by the Egyptian Government from registering officially.  The Government "froze" them, neither asking them to leave nor allowing them to undertake activities in Egypt. With these constraints, neither of them could undertake meaningful activities to strengthen the parties within the country. Instead, both of them organized political party training outside Egypt. NDI also made major progress in building the capacity of NGOs to monitor elections.

In post-revolutionary Egypt, if Constitutional, legal and regulatory changes open up the system for truly competitive partisan elections, both existing and new political parties will require time and assistance to develop their potential.  If they are able to access assistance from the donor community, they will still not be ready to compete effectively in the Presidential elections scheduled for September 2011.  They also might not be ready to compete with the Muslim Brotherhood for many years, if it is permitted to establish a party or field candidates.

Donor assistance for political parties, which would be required over many years, should focus on organizational development, electoral development and party governance. Implementers of such programs would need to build skills in the following areas: strategic planning; research; party building; professionalization; organizational management; building local organizations; fundraising and financial management; developing agendas and platforms; recruiting, managing and retaining members and volunteers; media communications; outreach; voter mobilization; running campaigns; recruiting and training candidates; canvassing voters; targeting women, youth and the disadvantaged; improving party governance; building a loyal opposition, and managing power. 

This vast effort would entail a long effort and a sustained commitment by the international community.  It also would require being responsive to the expressed needs of the political parties, rather than imposing a standard package of assistance. Regardless of how long it takes for parties to develop, it is clear that they will operate in an environment of freedom that has not been seen in Egypt for over sixty years. 

Rick Gold