Mubarak's Exit and Foreign Intervention

Mubarak finally is history, and the Egyptian people have overcome fear and lies to remove him. They overcame the fear of State Security, who were omnipresent and repressive. They overcame the fear of the National Democratic Party-hired thugs, petty criminals and gang members who beat up political opponents. They overcame the fear of supporting alternatives to Mubarak and the NDP, such as opposition political parties or the Muslim Brotherhood.  Finally, they overcame the fear of a future without Mubarak.

The big lie was that a repressive state apparatus under Mubarak was the only choice for the Egyptian people. Another lie was that a constant state of emergency was required to deal with the threat of terrorism. Egyptians also overcame Mubarak's lie that they were not ready or capable of participating in free and fair elections.

One lie the people have had difficulty counteracting is the Government's condemnation of support by foreign groups or countries for democracy initiatives in Egypt. This lie has been used frequently by Mubarak to repress activists and civil society groups working for political reform. He even used this canard in his last speech on February 10, in which he refused to resign. This time, no one listened, because Egyptians knew in their hearts that they were taking full responsibility for bringing Mubarak down.

Fear of foreign intervention is in fact justified, since the country was under foreign control for two millennia. Egyptians took their fate in their hands in the 1920's, with the creation of the Wafd Party and Muslim Brotherhood, both focused on purging the country of foreign influences and British control. Following the military revolt against the monarchy in 1952, President Gamal Abdel Nasser made many Egyptians proud of his anti-imperialist policies, nationalist views, 1956 seizure of the Suez Canal and 1967 attack on Israel.  Although Nasser lost the Sinai to Israel, he is still viewed as a great leader because of his efforts to build Egypt's strength and leadership of the Arab world. One of the major opposition parties today follows Nasserism.

The Soviet Union strongly supported Nasser and bankrolled the Aswan High Dam. Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, expelled Soviet military advisers, led Egypt to fight the 1973 war with Israel and allied with the US to sign the Camp David Accords with Israel.  Many Egyptians believed that the peace treaty was a betrayal of Nasser's nationalist and pan-Arab ideals. Even though Egypt received about 70 billion dollars in military and economic assistance from the US in support of the Accords, its leaders frequently accused America of intervening in its internal affairs. Egyptian Government officials accused American technicians of imposing themselves and their programs on their Egyptian colleagues.

Mubarak tried to find a balance between accepting US assistance for Egypt's support of the Camp David Accords and exercising complete control of Egypt's political life.  Through his officials and government-controlled media, he frequently criticized the Bush Administration's calls for political reform and support for democracy and civil society. The government put strict controls on foreign funding of civil society organizations.

The Mubarak regime was successful in making criticism of foreign intervention politically correct.  Even some political reform activists whose organizations received USAID and State Department support felt it necessary to make public statements against US democracy programs.  Some newspapers, including those supported by the Government and those in opposition, ran long-term campaigns against democracy assistance, publishing frequent commentary condemning such assistance.

In the post-Mubarak period, with many of the fears overcome and lies dispelled, the Egyptian people need to analyze the new opportunities and constraints of their political environment.  They need to define their long-term interests and identify their capacity for putting in place the legal framework and democratic institutions they need, as well as the areas where support from international donors will be necessary. Egyptians and the international community must work together to build partnerships that strengthen the democratic system and respect the interests of the Egyptian people.

Rick Gold

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The Quality of Egypt's Democratic Institutions

Much of the efforts by Egyptian civil society, human rights and political reform organizations were directed toward asserting rights in an oppressive political system. Activities, such as civic education, voter registration, increasing the participation of women in political campaigns, building political parties and strengthening civil society's oversight of the government and security sector, were in many ways premature.  They assumed that Egypt's democratic institutions were transparent, responsive and accountable.  This assumption was invalid.

The current Egyptian Constitution, put in place in 1971 by President Sadat, facilitated the rise of a regime that used Egyptian institutions and government resources to assure its survival. Under the 1980 amendment, Islamic law (Sharia) became the principal source of legislative rules. After the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, President Mubarak used the control of the Parliament by his political party, the National Democratic Party (NDP) to repeatedly declare a state of emergency, which continues until this day. The state of emergency removes citizens' protections and provides the military and state security with the legitimate authority to abuse rights and freedoms.  Consequently, these entities, along with the national police, view their mandate as protecting the Mubarak regime, rather than the citizens or the state.

Constitutional amendments in 2005 and 2007 provided a veneer of political reform, including allowing elections of the President for the first time.  However, the restrictions on eligibility for presidential candidates were so tight that only President Mubarak's party will be eligible to nominate a candidate for the planned September 2011 elections. The Constitution does not contain term limits for the presidency, which has allowed President Mubarak to stay in office for thirty years.

Many Egyptian bureaucrats were given large discretion over government resources, but received low salaries. The result was extensive and systemic corruption, which allowed abuses by the elite, harassment of women and the poor and enrichment of senior government officials. Citizens receive inadequate or poor quality social services, such as education and health.  Few mechanisms existed for citizens to provide feedback to government officials. The Muslim Brotherhood filled this vacuum by providing citizens with the social services they needed.

Despite regular elections, the NDP, has been able to gain control of the Parliament either by itself or in coalition with other parties.  The NDP has been given the authority to approve or disapprove new parties.  By using governmental resources to reward its supporters and punish its opponents, the NDP has prevented its opponents from gaining power.  Strong partisan political leaders, such as Ayman Nour, have been imprisoned on trumped-up charges.  Consequently, no true political parties exist today.

The Parliament is under the complete control of the NDP.  It operates as a rubber stamp for the legislation and budget bills submitted by the Government. In the 2005 Parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood won 20% of the seats of the lower house. While its members were able to raise issues, they were not in a position to influence the legislative agenda. Parliament rarely exercises its authority to provide oversight of government operations.

The justice system is the least discredited Egyptian institution. Judges are well trained and more conscientious than bureaucrats about pursuing the public interest. Through the Council of State, the judiciary can condemn and penalize the government for its actions. During elections, citizens trust them to resolve problems at voting stations. Yet corruption tempts judges and court administrators. In some cases, government officials can influence the outcome of cases.

As Egypt enters a post-revolutionary period, the Egyptian people will  need to take on a role not only of holding government accountable, but also of overseeing the complete restructuring of Egypt's Constitution, legal framework and democratic institutions. They will require strong support by the international community as they attempt to accomplish this decades-long set of tasks.

USAID support to Egyptian Human Rights and Political Reform Groups

To gain insight into the anti-Mubarak movement, it is important to understand the type of support some of the key civil society organizations received from donors.  The democracy grants issued by USAID from 2005 through 2009 built the capacity of these organizations.  The major issue we confronted was whether to confine our funding to those non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that were registered with the Ministry of Social Solidarity.  Such organizations, even those dedicated to human rights, operated under severe restrictions and were under the complete control of State Security.  On the other hand, it also was possible to provide grants to "civil companies," which were registered as private companies with a social purpose.  While these companies were required to coordinate informally with State Security, they operated with much more freedom than NGOs. 

USAID funded both types of organizations during this period.  In response to strong pressure from the Mubarak regime against funding civil companies, USAID restricted its funding to legally registered NGOs beginning in about 2009.  The human rights organizations funded by USAID after 2009 operated with less freedom and closer oversight from the State Security apparatus.

From 2005-2009, USAID approved over 50 grants valued at over $40 million. Egyptian NGOs included:

• Alliance for Arab Women
• Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services (CEOSS)
• New Horizons
• Environmental Quality International
• South Egypt Development Association at Qena
• Kanater
• BWADI
• GAYD
• Egyptian NGO Support Center
• Association for the Development of Education
• El Nakib Center

Some of the civil companies and law firms included:

• Arab Penal Reform Organization
• Andalus Institute
• United Group
• Ibn Khaldun Center
• Afro-Egyptian Human Rights Organization
• One World Foundation
• Maat

Other grants went to American or international organizations that partnered with Egyptian organizations, including:

• CEDPA
• Internews
• National Democratic Institute
• International Republican Institute
• International Foundation for Electoral Systems
• American Bar Association 
• America's Development Foundation
• Freedom House

The grants funded a wide range of activities, including:

• election monitoring;
• promoting political engagement of youth, women, and the disabled;
• using the media for civic education;
• defending journalists;
• promoting freedom of information;
• providing legal assistance to the poor and vulnerable;
• cultivating human rights activists;
• strengthening civil society oversight of government;
• increasing participation in local decision-making; and
• building a human rights culture.

USAID examined the management controls of each organization receiving funding and provided assistance to strengthen these controls.  Consequently, the management skills and systems of these human rights organizations improved, making them eligible for larger grants from multiple donors.

USAID grants to human rights and political reform organizations helped them to undertake activities to expand rights and build citizen support for democracy.  More importantly, the grants also strengthened the capacity of these organizations to undertake the long struggle necessary to build a movement with enough cohesion to remove Mubarak from office.  As Egypt moves into a post-revolutionary environment, its success in putting in place viable democratic institutions will depend upon the capacity of Egyptian civil society organizations to play their role. It is essential that they focus on building their capacity as they take on increased responsibility to lead Egypt into the future. USAID and other donors should undertake a major initiative to build politically engaged civil society, regardless of the registration status of these organizations.

Rick Gold

Adding Context to the Discussion on Egypt's future

We know that President Mubarak will soon be history. And we know that civil society groups will be responsible for his ouster.  While much of the discussion by bloggers and the formal media have focused on the anti-Mubarak and pro-Mubarak factions, we have heard little about the organizers of the marches and demonstrations.  We have seen little analysis of the strength of the human rights organizations and political reform groups, how they have built their capacity and what role they might play in post-revolutionary Egypt.

I intend to add this missing dimension of the analysis of today's events and prognosis for the future.  From 2004-2007, I oversaw USAID's portfolio of democracy programs in Egypt.  Many of these programs were designed and implemented by Egyptian organizations, and USAID funded them despite tremendous hostility from the Egyptian Government and the state-financed media.  My experience with hundreds of Egyptian organizations has given me some insight into the political environment that kept them weak and divided and delayed the development of the political movement that is unseating Mubarak. 

I want to emphasize that we are witnessing the struggle of the Egyptian people, and that any efforts by donors such as USAID to strengthen civil society groups and democratic institutions were intended to enable these groups to build a movement that reflected their own values and interests. What we are seeing today is the recognition that all of these groups have one common interest - removing Mubarak.  I hope to identify where their interests diverge and how that might influence the formation of coalitions that cooperate and compete for power, in a post-Mubarak Egypt. 
Rick Gold