Looking Forward, Looking Back in Egypt

Tora Prison – Where Mubarak’s political prisoners were tortured and government leaders now await trial

Egyptians recognize that they have little time to overcome the power of the traditional elite groups and put in place the rules and the institutions needed to guarantee the rights of all citizens, especially those who were marginalized under the Mubarak regime.  At the same time, they need to deal with the legacy of past abuses.  They need to express their sense of justice by dealing with those who escaped it or suffered from its absence under the Mubarak regime. The challenge is to create a sense of closure without slowing the process of creating a more democratic society.

Addressing the wrongs of a deposed authoritarian regime is generally known as transitional justice. Under Mubarak, Egypt had an enormous number of wrongs, and all but a few Egyptians were victims of his regime.  He kept a state of emergency in place for 30 years, nullifying constitutional protections. Mubarak used State Security to protect his regime and control all aspects of society, using persecution, repression and torture to keep the population and all organized groups in line. Police were allowed to prey on the population, especially political opponents, human rights advocates and the Muslim Brotherhood, employing torture as standard practice. The security institutions made it impossible for civil society, political parties, media and labor to exercise the independence needed to challenge government abuses. Mubarak’s government strong-armed the judiciary, often telephoning in the decisions that were to be reached and preventing any serious investigation of corruption. The ruling National Democratic Party used state resources to bribe the population into voting for its candidates and turned the Parliament into a rubber stamp for government decisions.  Mubarak and his family, friends and business partners became enormously rich from corruption that permeated the entire government. 

To establish transitional justice, Egyptians must first assess what factors allowed Mubarak to gain such extraordinary power over their lives and the ability to abuse the country’s resources without adequate checks or controls. They must differentiate the victimizers from the victims. Only then can they punish the most corrupt and those who caused the greatest suffering, compensate those who suffered the most and forgive those who had no choice but to use the privileges given to them by the regime to oppress their fellow citizens. In the medium term, Egyptians must assess the weaknesses of their security, political and financial systems that facilitated abuse and corruption. Based on such assessments, they must reform these systems so that they serve people, rather than oppress them.

Since the end of World War II, many countries have adapted transitional justice tools to their needs to deal with past abuses. These tools included removing political leaders; releasing political prisoners: holding war crime trials, using domestic, regional or international courts; undertaking civilian court prosecutions for corruption and human rights abuses; organizing truth and reconciliation commissions, to identify perpetrators and seek forgiveness and reconciliation; compensating victims; and memorializing those who lost their lives.  Many countries have added to these symbolic efforts major reforms of security sector institutions.

Some of the demands of Egypt’s revolutionary youth focused on transitional justice. Here is their status as of May 4, 2011:

1. Removing Mubarak from office - completed
2. Dissolving the People's Assembly and Shura Council - completed
3. Canceling the emergency law – promised before Parliamentary elections in September. However, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has backtracked. Their Law No. 34 of 2011 stipulates a prison sentence and a fine of up to 50,000 Egyptian Pounds (about $8,400) for anyone who takes part in or encourages others to join a sit-in or any other activity that prevents, delays or disrupts the work of public institutions or public authorities. If there is any violence or if protests damage public and private property, lead to the “destruction of means of production” or cause harm to “national unity and public security and order,” the fine rises to 500,000 Egyptian Pounds (about $84,000) with at least a year’s imprisonment.
4. Prosecuting individuals responsible for the murder of revolution martyrs –Ex-Minister of Interior El Adli and four high ranking security officials were referred to trial for ordering murders of protestors. Mubarak is being questioned about his role.  The Minister of Justice expects to charge him for the deaths of protestors, and says he may be eligible for the death penalty.
5. Prosecuting those responsible for major corruption – Many ex-government leaders and businesspeople have been charged. Ex-Minister of Interior El Adli was sentenced to 12 years for corruption.
6. Releasing political prisoners – Thousands of prisoners were released during the revolution. Dozens of Islamist political prisoners have been released since then, including two who were imprisoned for assassinating President Anwar Sadat. Hundreds remain in prison.
7. Abolishing State Security – completed, but the fate of officers is unclear.
8. Dissolving the National Democratic Party and transferring its assets to the state – completed
9. Comprehensive reform of the Ministry of Interior – No plans identified

In early March, a group of Egyptians created the Egyptian Movement for Transitional Justice to identify and advocate for the actions required to cleanse their society of the Mubarak regime and to maintain pressure on the military and civilian governments to undertake them quickly. Their demands are in five areas:

1.   Prosecution of Regime leaders – To be credible, these trials must meet international standards. The purpose is to show that the people will eventually hold these leaders accountable for their crimes. The civilian transitional government rather than the military should determine who to prosecute.

2.   Establishment of a fact-finding committee to identify crimes against the people – Such a committee will identify and publicize the crimes, determine how and why they occurred and pardon those who confess.  One of the more appropriate models for Egypt is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission established by South Africa to deal with the crimes of the apartheid era.

3.   Provide restitution to victims – Since most Egyptians were victims in some manner, those who were hurt most severely should be compensated, perhaps with payments or with employment.  The objective is to help the population overcome a feeling of victimhood.

4.   Reform oppressive institutions – Through a new constitution, revised legislation and the creation of effective internal and external controls, prevent institutions from being used as tools of oppression by government leaders. These institutions include the Ministry of Interior, the police, the judiciary and the media.

5.   Prevent the reestablishment of authoritarianism – Undertake actions to prevent the population from forgetting the severity of their oppression under Mubarak. For example, create a museum that documents torture by State Security and the police.

After their horrible experience under President Mubarak, Egyptians truly need transitional justice.  The efforts of the revolutionary youth provided an important focus on addressing the obstacles to progress. The Egyptian Movement for Transitional Justice has provided a clearer picture of the steps that must be taken.  Pressure from these groups has forced the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to undertake some actions that the vast majority of Egyptians never dreamed would occur in their lifetime. 

Addressing the past should not obscure the measures required to create the legal framework and institutions that Egypt needs to tap all of its human and natural potential.  It will take a conscientious, persistent effort by new visionaries to keep Egyptians focused on both challenges simultaneously.

Rick Gold

cross-posted in Secular Perspectives

Mubarak's Exit and Foreign Intervention

Mubarak finally is history, and the Egyptian people have overcome fear and lies to remove him. They overcame the fear of State Security, who were omnipresent and repressive. They overcame the fear of the National Democratic Party-hired thugs, petty criminals and gang members who beat up political opponents. They overcame the fear of supporting alternatives to Mubarak and the NDP, such as opposition political parties or the Muslim Brotherhood.  Finally, they overcame the fear of a future without Mubarak.

The big lie was that a repressive state apparatus under Mubarak was the only choice for the Egyptian people. Another lie was that a constant state of emergency was required to deal with the threat of terrorism. Egyptians also overcame Mubarak's lie that they were not ready or capable of participating in free and fair elections.

One lie the people have had difficulty counteracting is the Government's condemnation of support by foreign groups or countries for democracy initiatives in Egypt. This lie has been used frequently by Mubarak to repress activists and civil society groups working for political reform. He even used this canard in his last speech on February 10, in which he refused to resign. This time, no one listened, because Egyptians knew in their hearts that they were taking full responsibility for bringing Mubarak down.

Fear of foreign intervention is in fact justified, since the country was under foreign control for two millennia. Egyptians took their fate in their hands in the 1920's, with the creation of the Wafd Party and Muslim Brotherhood, both focused on purging the country of foreign influences and British control. Following the military revolt against the monarchy in 1952, President Gamal Abdel Nasser made many Egyptians proud of his anti-imperialist policies, nationalist views, 1956 seizure of the Suez Canal and 1967 attack on Israel.  Although Nasser lost the Sinai to Israel, he is still viewed as a great leader because of his efforts to build Egypt's strength and leadership of the Arab world. One of the major opposition parties today follows Nasserism.

The Soviet Union strongly supported Nasser and bankrolled the Aswan High Dam. Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, expelled Soviet military advisers, led Egypt to fight the 1973 war with Israel and allied with the US to sign the Camp David Accords with Israel.  Many Egyptians believed that the peace treaty was a betrayal of Nasser's nationalist and pan-Arab ideals. Even though Egypt received about 70 billion dollars in military and economic assistance from the US in support of the Accords, its leaders frequently accused America of intervening in its internal affairs. Egyptian Government officials accused American technicians of imposing themselves and their programs on their Egyptian colleagues.

Mubarak tried to find a balance between accepting US assistance for Egypt's support of the Camp David Accords and exercising complete control of Egypt's political life.  Through his officials and government-controlled media, he frequently criticized the Bush Administration's calls for political reform and support for democracy and civil society. The government put strict controls on foreign funding of civil society organizations.

The Mubarak regime was successful in making criticism of foreign intervention politically correct.  Even some political reform activists whose organizations received USAID and State Department support felt it necessary to make public statements against US democracy programs.  Some newspapers, including those supported by the Government and those in opposition, ran long-term campaigns against democracy assistance, publishing frequent commentary condemning such assistance.

In the post-Mubarak period, with many of the fears overcome and lies dispelled, the Egyptian people need to analyze the new opportunities and constraints of their political environment.  They need to define their long-term interests and identify their capacity for putting in place the legal framework and democratic institutions they need, as well as the areas where support from international donors will be necessary. Egyptians and the international community must work together to build partnerships that strengthen the democratic system and respect the interests of the Egyptian people.

Rick Gold

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Adding Context to the Discussion on Egypt's future

We know that President Mubarak will soon be history. And we know that civil society groups will be responsible for his ouster.  While much of the discussion by bloggers and the formal media have focused on the anti-Mubarak and pro-Mubarak factions, we have heard little about the organizers of the marches and demonstrations.  We have seen little analysis of the strength of the human rights organizations and political reform groups, how they have built their capacity and what role they might play in post-revolutionary Egypt.

I intend to add this missing dimension of the analysis of today's events and prognosis for the future.  From 2004-2007, I oversaw USAID's portfolio of democracy programs in Egypt.  Many of these programs were designed and implemented by Egyptian organizations, and USAID funded them despite tremendous hostility from the Egyptian Government and the state-financed media.  My experience with hundreds of Egyptian organizations has given me some insight into the political environment that kept them weak and divided and delayed the development of the political movement that is unseating Mubarak. 

I want to emphasize that we are witnessing the struggle of the Egyptian people, and that any efforts by donors such as USAID to strengthen civil society groups and democratic institutions were intended to enable these groups to build a movement that reflected their own values and interests. What we are seeing today is the recognition that all of these groups have one common interest - removing Mubarak.  I hope to identify where their interests diverge and how that might influence the formation of coalitions that cooperate and compete for power, in a post-Mubarak Egypt. 
Rick Gold