Looking Forward, Looking Back in Egypt

Tora Prison – Where Mubarak’s political prisoners were tortured and government leaders now await trial

Egyptians recognize that they have little time to overcome the power of the traditional elite groups and put in place the rules and the institutions needed to guarantee the rights of all citizens, especially those who were marginalized under the Mubarak regime.  At the same time, they need to deal with the legacy of past abuses.  They need to express their sense of justice by dealing with those who escaped it or suffered from its absence under the Mubarak regime. The challenge is to create a sense of closure without slowing the process of creating a more democratic society.

Addressing the wrongs of a deposed authoritarian regime is generally known as transitional justice. Under Mubarak, Egypt had an enormous number of wrongs, and all but a few Egyptians were victims of his regime.  He kept a state of emergency in place for 30 years, nullifying constitutional protections. Mubarak used State Security to protect his regime and control all aspects of society, using persecution, repression and torture to keep the population and all organized groups in line. Police were allowed to prey on the population, especially political opponents, human rights advocates and the Muslim Brotherhood, employing torture as standard practice. The security institutions made it impossible for civil society, political parties, media and labor to exercise the independence needed to challenge government abuses. Mubarak’s government strong-armed the judiciary, often telephoning in the decisions that were to be reached and preventing any serious investigation of corruption. The ruling National Democratic Party used state resources to bribe the population into voting for its candidates and turned the Parliament into a rubber stamp for government decisions.  Mubarak and his family, friends and business partners became enormously rich from corruption that permeated the entire government. 

To establish transitional justice, Egyptians must first assess what factors allowed Mubarak to gain such extraordinary power over their lives and the ability to abuse the country’s resources without adequate checks or controls. They must differentiate the victimizers from the victims. Only then can they punish the most corrupt and those who caused the greatest suffering, compensate those who suffered the most and forgive those who had no choice but to use the privileges given to them by the regime to oppress their fellow citizens. In the medium term, Egyptians must assess the weaknesses of their security, political and financial systems that facilitated abuse and corruption. Based on such assessments, they must reform these systems so that they serve people, rather than oppress them.

Since the end of World War II, many countries have adapted transitional justice tools to their needs to deal with past abuses. These tools included removing political leaders; releasing political prisoners: holding war crime trials, using domestic, regional or international courts; undertaking civilian court prosecutions for corruption and human rights abuses; organizing truth and reconciliation commissions, to identify perpetrators and seek forgiveness and reconciliation; compensating victims; and memorializing those who lost their lives.  Many countries have added to these symbolic efforts major reforms of security sector institutions.

Some of the demands of Egypt’s revolutionary youth focused on transitional justice. Here is their status as of May 4, 2011:

1. Removing Mubarak from office - completed
2. Dissolving the People's Assembly and Shura Council - completed
3. Canceling the emergency law – promised before Parliamentary elections in September. However, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has backtracked. Their Law No. 34 of 2011 stipulates a prison sentence and a fine of up to 50,000 Egyptian Pounds (about $8,400) for anyone who takes part in or encourages others to join a sit-in or any other activity that prevents, delays or disrupts the work of public institutions or public authorities. If there is any violence or if protests damage public and private property, lead to the “destruction of means of production” or cause harm to “national unity and public security and order,” the fine rises to 500,000 Egyptian Pounds (about $84,000) with at least a year’s imprisonment.
4. Prosecuting individuals responsible for the murder of revolution martyrs –Ex-Minister of Interior El Adli and four high ranking security officials were referred to trial for ordering murders of protestors. Mubarak is being questioned about his role.  The Minister of Justice expects to charge him for the deaths of protestors, and says he may be eligible for the death penalty.
5. Prosecuting those responsible for major corruption – Many ex-government leaders and businesspeople have been charged. Ex-Minister of Interior El Adli was sentenced to 12 years for corruption.
6. Releasing political prisoners – Thousands of prisoners were released during the revolution. Dozens of Islamist political prisoners have been released since then, including two who were imprisoned for assassinating President Anwar Sadat. Hundreds remain in prison.
7. Abolishing State Security – completed, but the fate of officers is unclear.
8. Dissolving the National Democratic Party and transferring its assets to the state – completed
9. Comprehensive reform of the Ministry of Interior – No plans identified

In early March, a group of Egyptians created the Egyptian Movement for Transitional Justice to identify and advocate for the actions required to cleanse their society of the Mubarak regime and to maintain pressure on the military and civilian governments to undertake them quickly. Their demands are in five areas:

1.   Prosecution of Regime leaders – To be credible, these trials must meet international standards. The purpose is to show that the people will eventually hold these leaders accountable for their crimes. The civilian transitional government rather than the military should determine who to prosecute.

2.   Establishment of a fact-finding committee to identify crimes against the people – Such a committee will identify and publicize the crimes, determine how and why they occurred and pardon those who confess.  One of the more appropriate models for Egypt is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission established by South Africa to deal with the crimes of the apartheid era.

3.   Provide restitution to victims – Since most Egyptians were victims in some manner, those who were hurt most severely should be compensated, perhaps with payments or with employment.  The objective is to help the population overcome a feeling of victimhood.

4.   Reform oppressive institutions – Through a new constitution, revised legislation and the creation of effective internal and external controls, prevent institutions from being used as tools of oppression by government leaders. These institutions include the Ministry of Interior, the police, the judiciary and the media.

5.   Prevent the reestablishment of authoritarianism – Undertake actions to prevent the population from forgetting the severity of their oppression under Mubarak. For example, create a museum that documents torture by State Security and the police.

After their horrible experience under President Mubarak, Egyptians truly need transitional justice.  The efforts of the revolutionary youth provided an important focus on addressing the obstacles to progress. The Egyptian Movement for Transitional Justice has provided a clearer picture of the steps that must be taken.  Pressure from these groups has forced the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to undertake some actions that the vast majority of Egyptians never dreamed would occur in their lifetime. 

Addressing the past should not obscure the measures required to create the legal framework and institutions that Egypt needs to tap all of its human and natural potential.  It will take a conscientious, persistent effort by new visionaries to keep Egyptians focused on both challenges simultaneously.

Rick Gold

cross-posted in Secular Perspectives

Moving Toward a Civilian-led Egyptian Government

Many Egyptians, despite having great pride in the armed forces, dream of the day when the military no longer rules society.  To do so, they must build the power of civilian authorities to exercise control over the military. To begin this process, they must put in place a constitution that institutionalizes democracy, assures the rights of minorities and guarantees civilian control of the military.

The revolution, which was sparked by Egyptian youth, led the military to play a more overt role in governing Egypt.  In fact, the military had been in control of the country since it took power from the monarchy in 1952. Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak all came from the military, and many Government leaders either had military backgrounds or were selected by the military.

Most Egyptians have faith that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) will facilitate the election of a new parliament and president.  Such faith is not based on modern Egyptian history, however. Egyptians believed that the military would cede power to a civilian government in 1952, but Nasser took power instead.  This time, the military is more likely to step aside, for two important reasons:

1. It has built its power through control of major parts of the economy, including industry and land, so it has little need to control government directly as well.

2. Through its massive military assistance program, the US Government has trained many leaders to understand the role of the military in a democratic society. Some Egyptians believe that the US pressured the Egyptian military into removing Mubarak and pledging to transfer power to a civilian government.

The underpinning of any modern state is its constitution or set of basic laws.  Egypt has had many constitutions over the last 150 years. The importance of constitutions has been diminished in the last 60 years due to extensive periods of time under emergency law, when many constitutional rights were set aside. Nevertheless, Egypt can only begin the transition to a civilian-led state by putting into place a new or significantly amended constitution.  Moreover, Egyptians must make sustained efforts to enforce and defend their constitution.

Constitutions represent the vision of a people for their society, state and government.  So far, Egyptians have been unable to begin the debate that leads to a common vision. Instead, they have paid more attention to casting off the baggage from the past.  After the departure of Mubarak, the Coalition of Revolutionary Youth negotiated, both around the table and at Tahrir Square, a set of demands. These demands included cancellation of the state of emergency; release of political prisoners; cancellation of the constitution; dissolution of the parliament and local popular councils; dissolution of the ruling National Democratic Party and State Security; and enforcement of judicial decisions. The Youth demanded a transitional presidential council with civil and military representatives and a credible transitional government prior to parliamentary and presidential elections. During the transition period, they expected greater freedom for political parties, stronger political rights and increased freedom of association. These rights would be enshrined in a new constitution that reduces the powers of the President, strengthens separation of power and increases the fairness of elections.
 
The SCAF, demonstrating its interest in expediting the transfer of power to an elected government, appointed a commission to propose constitutional amendments that would allow an early election of a parliament and president.  In a major break from the past, it included a Muslim Brotherhood leader in the committee. The committee proposed eight amendments, and the SCAF gave the population only three weeks to review them before voting them up or down in a referendum. 
 
The amendments made it more difficult to proclaim and maintain a state of emergency, limited the presidency to at most two four-year terms, required that "he" not be married to a non-Egyptian, strengthened judicial supervision of elections, required the president to appoint a deputy, provided easier access to presidential elections by candidates and established a commission to draft a new constitution following the parliamentary election.

Egyptians did not take advantage of the review period to analyze and debate the implications of each of the amendments.  Instead, they divided into pro- and anti-camps, based on whether they saw the referendum as increasing or hurting their chances of winning the parliamentary and presidential elections.  The revolutionary youth, the Coptic Church and many civil society groups led a campaign to vote no, based on the weakness of checks on executive authority and the fear that the Muslim Brotherhood or remnants of the National Democratic Party would win early elections. The MB and the NDP were successful in gaining the support of the population for early elections, as the referendum was approved by 77% of the 18.3 million valid votes. 

The SCAF has set parliamentary elections for September 2011 and presidential elections for November 2011, although these dates are not fixed. According to one of the approved constitutional amendments, the president and parliament will appoint a 100-member constituent assembly within six months of elections to rewrite the constitution over the course of a subsequent six-month period, which would be approved or disapproved through a referendum.

It is essential now for Egyptians to begin the profound public debate about the type of post-revolutionary society, state and government they envision and how a new constitution would enable them to achieve these goals.  Such a task is difficult, given the need to also deal with the past, develop political parties and put in place the rules and safeguards for free and fair elections.  However, delaying such a discussion will empower those forces already dominating society, such as the military, the remnants of state security, the Muslim Brotherhood, elite businesspeople and remnants of the National Democratic Party.  The solidarity among groups that participated in the Tahrir Square uprising must be maintained for Egyptians to see their common interest in putting in place a constitution that establishes a civilian led-government, provides civilian oversight of the military and other components of the security sector, provides checks and balances among democratic institutions and safeguards the interests of minorities. The constitutional debate must start now and must empower Egyptians to put in place the systems that enable groups, ideas and values to compete fairly for power. 

Rick Gold

Cross-posted in Secular Perspectives

Mubarak's Exit and Foreign Intervention

Mubarak finally is history, and the Egyptian people have overcome fear and lies to remove him. They overcame the fear of State Security, who were omnipresent and repressive. They overcame the fear of the National Democratic Party-hired thugs, petty criminals and gang members who beat up political opponents. They overcame the fear of supporting alternatives to Mubarak and the NDP, such as opposition political parties or the Muslim Brotherhood.  Finally, they overcame the fear of a future without Mubarak.

The big lie was that a repressive state apparatus under Mubarak was the only choice for the Egyptian people. Another lie was that a constant state of emergency was required to deal with the threat of terrorism. Egyptians also overcame Mubarak's lie that they were not ready or capable of participating in free and fair elections.

One lie the people have had difficulty counteracting is the Government's condemnation of support by foreign groups or countries for democracy initiatives in Egypt. This lie has been used frequently by Mubarak to repress activists and civil society groups working for political reform. He even used this canard in his last speech on February 10, in which he refused to resign. This time, no one listened, because Egyptians knew in their hearts that they were taking full responsibility for bringing Mubarak down.

Fear of foreign intervention is in fact justified, since the country was under foreign control for two millennia. Egyptians took their fate in their hands in the 1920's, with the creation of the Wafd Party and Muslim Brotherhood, both focused on purging the country of foreign influences and British control. Following the military revolt against the monarchy in 1952, President Gamal Abdel Nasser made many Egyptians proud of his anti-imperialist policies, nationalist views, 1956 seizure of the Suez Canal and 1967 attack on Israel.  Although Nasser lost the Sinai to Israel, he is still viewed as a great leader because of his efforts to build Egypt's strength and leadership of the Arab world. One of the major opposition parties today follows Nasserism.

The Soviet Union strongly supported Nasser and bankrolled the Aswan High Dam. Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, expelled Soviet military advisers, led Egypt to fight the 1973 war with Israel and allied with the US to sign the Camp David Accords with Israel.  Many Egyptians believed that the peace treaty was a betrayal of Nasser's nationalist and pan-Arab ideals. Even though Egypt received about 70 billion dollars in military and economic assistance from the US in support of the Accords, its leaders frequently accused America of intervening in its internal affairs. Egyptian Government officials accused American technicians of imposing themselves and their programs on their Egyptian colleagues.

Mubarak tried to find a balance between accepting US assistance for Egypt's support of the Camp David Accords and exercising complete control of Egypt's political life.  Through his officials and government-controlled media, he frequently criticized the Bush Administration's calls for political reform and support for democracy and civil society. The government put strict controls on foreign funding of civil society organizations.

The Mubarak regime was successful in making criticism of foreign intervention politically correct.  Even some political reform activists whose organizations received USAID and State Department support felt it necessary to make public statements against US democracy programs.  Some newspapers, including those supported by the Government and those in opposition, ran long-term campaigns against democracy assistance, publishing frequent commentary condemning such assistance.

In the post-Mubarak period, with many of the fears overcome and lies dispelled, the Egyptian people need to analyze the new opportunities and constraints of their political environment.  They need to define their long-term interests and identify their capacity for putting in place the legal framework and democratic institutions they need, as well as the areas where support from international donors will be necessary. Egyptians and the international community must work together to build partnerships that strengthen the democratic system and respect the interests of the Egyptian people.

Rick Gold

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The Revolution's Significance for Political Parties

The complete control of Egypt's political system by President Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP), combined with its monopoly on access to government resources, has prevented the development of viable opposition parties and facilitated the growth of an authoritarian regime. None of Egypt's 24 approved political parties nor its many unapproved political movements could be considered true political parties, according to international standards. The NDP is no more than a patronage organization that buys votes, either by providing citizens with government-funded social services prior to elections or actually paying them to vote NDP.

The 24 approved political parties do not offer citizens a legitimate means of political expression, nor do they engage in serious competition and dialogue. The five major approved parties neither represent citizen interests nor promote long-term citizen involvement in the electoral system.  They also do not use modern methods of governance or of selecting candidates. They have limited outreach at regional and local levels.  Some of these parties have boycotted multiple elections, which they knew were rigged.

The NDP has used constitutional provisions, laws, policies and administrative practices to stifle any true partisan political competition.  When I was living in Egypt in 2005, President Mubarak, the NDP leader, jailed the leader of the newly approved Al Ghad (Tomorrow) Party, Ayman Nour, after he had come in second in the Presidential elections.  Questionable schisms within the Al Ghad and Wafd Parties appeared to have been fomented by the NDP, in collaboration with State Security.

The NDP exercises effective control of the Political Party Affairs Committee, which has the authority to approve political parties. While the Committee has approved seven parties within the last six years, it has frozen some parties and denied or delayed approval to parties representing secular, Nasserist, and moderate Islamist leanings.  In addition, the Government has banned the Muslim Brotherhood since 1952 and prevented it from organizing a political party. 

In 2005, USAID provided funding to the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute to assess Egyptian political parties and to devise programs for modernizing them on a non-partisan basis. After undertaking assessments of some of the major parties, these Institutes were prevented by the Egyptian Government from registering officially.  The Government "froze" them, neither asking them to leave nor allowing them to undertake activities in Egypt. With these constraints, neither of them could undertake meaningful activities to strengthen the parties within the country. Instead, both of them organized political party training outside Egypt. NDI also made major progress in building the capacity of NGOs to monitor elections.

In post-revolutionary Egypt, if Constitutional, legal and regulatory changes open up the system for truly competitive partisan elections, both existing and new political parties will require time and assistance to develop their potential.  If they are able to access assistance from the donor community, they will still not be ready to compete effectively in the Presidential elections scheduled for September 2011.  They also might not be ready to compete with the Muslim Brotherhood for many years, if it is permitted to establish a party or field candidates.

Donor assistance for political parties, which would be required over many years, should focus on organizational development, electoral development and party governance. Implementers of such programs would need to build skills in the following areas: strategic planning; research; party building; professionalization; organizational management; building local organizations; fundraising and financial management; developing agendas and platforms; recruiting, managing and retaining members and volunteers; media communications; outreach; voter mobilization; running campaigns; recruiting and training candidates; canvassing voters; targeting women, youth and the disadvantaged; improving party governance; building a loyal opposition, and managing power. 

This vast effort would entail a long effort and a sustained commitment by the international community.  It also would require being responsive to the expressed needs of the political parties, rather than imposing a standard package of assistance. Regardless of how long it takes for parties to develop, it is clear that they will operate in an environment of freedom that has not been seen in Egypt for over sixty years. 

Rick Gold