Assuring Accountability for the Egyptian Security Sector

Egyptian Police on Trial for Killing Protesters

Egypt’s revolutionary youth recognize the importance of reforming the security sector to the future of Egypt. Their targets have included the police, prisons, State Security, Ministry of Interior and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Yet they have yet to develop an integrated view of the security sector. They do not yet have a clear vision on how the security sector must evolve to meet the needs of the Egyptian people and be accountable to them. Such a vision could be based on the concept of security sector reform (SSR), an idea that developed from the realization by many governments, academics, civil society actors and donors that strengthening law and order and security must be integrated with efforts to promote democratic development.

Attempts to Rein in the Security Sector

Prior to the January 25 revolution, anger against the police and state security had been mounting for decades. Under the emergency law, police abused human rights, tortured suspects and political opponents, and were free to engage in corruption. Some judges followed the dictates of the Ministry of Interior on important cases.  Prisons held thousands of political prisoners. State Security was omnipresent, intimidating anyone who could potentially challenge the ruling party.  Retired military leaders held major government positions and served as centrally appointed governors for many governorates. The military gained control of large portions of the economy through investments in key sectors. Civil society had no effective power to challenge abuses of these security sector institutions. The media had limited ability to analyze and report on them. The Parliament, captured by the ruling National Democratic Party, was too weak and disinterested to provide effective oversight.

Anger about the population’s treatment by security forces helped inspire activists to organize the first revolutionary demonstrations on Police Day, the day set aside to celebrate the police.  Over the next 18 days, police killed perhaps 800 protestors and wounded thousands more.  State Security facilitated attacks on protestors by thugs. Many police stations were burned, and prisons attacked.  Several days into the demonstrations, the Ministry of Interior, hoping to turn the population against the protestors, removed police from the streets. An ensuing crime wave forced residents to form neighborhood protection committees, in recognition that State Security had turned against the population and that the police were not serving their needs. Since February, the number of police on the streets has not increased to its previous levels, and many police have been reluctant to take steps to control crime. Individual safety has deteriorated significantly.

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces ordered President Mubarak to give up power on February 11. Protestors welcomed this step, declaring that they had complete trust in the military.  In February and March, the military stationed soldiers, tanks and other equipment in sensitive areas.  Hundreds of protestors were arrested and tried by military, rather than civilian courts. Some of those arrested complained of torture. Protestors attacked State Security Offices and retrieved files kept on political dissidents.  Recognizing the rage of the population over mistreatment by State Security, the Minister of Interior announced the dissolution of the Agency, to be replaced by an organization called National Security, with the sole mandate of addressing terrorism. 

Demonstrators and their families grew increasingly frustrated at delays in prosecuting those police identified as killing protestors.  In early July, demonstrators were outraged when a judge ordered the release on bail of seven police accused of killing protestors in the town of Suez.  Police then used tear gas and force against the family members of those killed, after some of them were excluded from a memorial service. Consequently, activists organized the second phase of the revolution, when hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets to express their displeasure at the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the Prime Minister.  The SCAF, in turn, vowed not to interfere with trials, in order to protect judicial independence. However, they recognized that justice must be expedited. In mid-July, the Ministry of Interior reshuffled about 4,000 police, including those held responsible for the killing of protestors and those believed to be corrupt. About 500 police generals and 150 senior officers were forced to take early retirement.  The Minister declared this reshuffle the largest in Egypt’s history.

Security Sector Reform

Transformation of the security sector is based on the understanding that people need safety and security through services that are accountable to them and protect their human rights. It also recognizes that the state needs to be protected from attack beyond its frontiers, but that military and intelligence services must operate within the rule of law. Safety and security require not only competent police, but also effective prosecutors and independent judges committed to the rule of law.  The aim is to reform security forces and services so they have clear and appropriate roles; adequate resources, training and incentives to achieve them; and operate in a manner that is both transparent and accountable to those they serve.  Security sector reform also requires empowerment of civil society, the media and Parliament, so that they provide appropriate oversight and demand accountability.  Where there are non-state security forces such as militias and thugs, SSR requires their removal or strict control.  An effective security sector requires common expectations and effective coordination by elected leaders, security forces and services, civil society and the media.   A good reference on security sector reform is “Safety, Security and Accessible Justice,” prepared by United Kingdom Department for International Development in July 2002, http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/SSAJ23.pdf.

In Egypt, the security sector requires reform desperately.  With support from international donors, military leaders, police and prosecutors have been trained on human rights and anti-corruption.  Such training is far from sufficient. The country requires a major transformation of the culture and institutions of the police and intelligence services, as well as clarification of the roles of the military and the prosecutors. In addition, judges need to be protected from interventions from security services and the executive branch.  The military has had difficulty playing its temporary role of leading the government overtly.  After elections, it will have an opportunity to focus more on national defense. However, it should remove itself from all aspects of governance, including withdrawing retired military leaders from high government positions.  Ideally, it should also give up control of its economic investments, which enables it to operate without civilian control. The new Parliament must gain an understanding of what to expect from the security sector, how to use the budget as a tool to control it, and how to use its capacity to summon officials to provide close oversight.  The media requires improved investigative journalism skills. Civil society organizations also need to be clear about what they expect from the security sector.  They should organize a movement to promote the sector’s reform and sustain efforts to monitor its transformation.  

Initiating Security Sector Reform in Egypt

With each institution requiring so much attention, it is difficult to determine where to start.  Revolutionary youth and political party and civil society leaders are in a good position to initiate the process, although implementation will require close coordination with elected leaders and each service.  All of these actors need to develop a deep understanding of security sector reform. To facilitate dialogue, Egyptian research institutes, with help from retired security sector officials, should undertake analyses of each service.  Each analysis should focus on the service’s current and desired role, culture, leadership, information system, inspection, incentive structure and customer service. In addition, it should assess the service’s coordination, transparency, accountability, and commitment to the rule of law and human rights.  Such studies will enable those outside the government to raise questions and identify issues that must be addressed by elected leaders and the services themselves. Further, these assessments will provide the basis for oversight by civil society, the media and Parliament as the process of security sector reform continues.

One methodology for a Security Sector Reform assessment is provided by USAID in its “Interagency Security Sector Assessment Framework,” October 2010, www.afcea.org/events/nps/11/documents/ISSAFFinal_001.pdf.   Egyptian researchers have made some initial efforts to assess the security sector in the post-revolutionary period. (See “Egyptian Security Sector Reforms,” Mohamed Kadry Said and Noha Bakr, January 2011,   http://arab-reform.net/IMG/pdf/Egypt_Security_Sector_Reforms-M-Said_and_Noha_Bakr_Eng.pdf) and “Reforming the Egyptian Security Services,” Tewfick Aclimandos, June 2011, http://www.arab-reform.net/IMG/pdf/Security_Sector_Reform_Tewfick_Aclimandos.pdf.

Security sector reform will not take place overnight in Egypt.  However, common awareness of the objectives and required process will keep the issue alive for the many years that will be required for these transformations to occur.   The benefits to Egyptian citizens and civilian leaders will be evident early on, while security sector personnel will gradually become more comfortable with their new roles.

Rick Gold

cross-posted in Secular Perspectives

The Quality of Egypt's Democratic Institutions

Much of the efforts by Egyptian civil society, human rights and political reform organizations were directed toward asserting rights in an oppressive political system. Activities, such as civic education, voter registration, increasing the participation of women in political campaigns, building political parties and strengthening civil society's oversight of the government and security sector, were in many ways premature.  They assumed that Egypt's democratic institutions were transparent, responsive and accountable.  This assumption was invalid.

The current Egyptian Constitution, put in place in 1971 by President Sadat, facilitated the rise of a regime that used Egyptian institutions and government resources to assure its survival. Under the 1980 amendment, Islamic law (Sharia) became the principal source of legislative rules. After the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, President Mubarak used the control of the Parliament by his political party, the National Democratic Party (NDP) to repeatedly declare a state of emergency, which continues until this day. The state of emergency removes citizens' protections and provides the military and state security with the legitimate authority to abuse rights and freedoms.  Consequently, these entities, along with the national police, view their mandate as protecting the Mubarak regime, rather than the citizens or the state.

Constitutional amendments in 2005 and 2007 provided a veneer of political reform, including allowing elections of the President for the first time.  However, the restrictions on eligibility for presidential candidates were so tight that only President Mubarak's party will be eligible to nominate a candidate for the planned September 2011 elections. The Constitution does not contain term limits for the presidency, which has allowed President Mubarak to stay in office for thirty years.

Many Egyptian bureaucrats were given large discretion over government resources, but received low salaries. The result was extensive and systemic corruption, which allowed abuses by the elite, harassment of women and the poor and enrichment of senior government officials. Citizens receive inadequate or poor quality social services, such as education and health.  Few mechanisms existed for citizens to provide feedback to government officials. The Muslim Brotherhood filled this vacuum by providing citizens with the social services they needed.

Despite regular elections, the NDP, has been able to gain control of the Parliament either by itself or in coalition with other parties.  The NDP has been given the authority to approve or disapprove new parties.  By using governmental resources to reward its supporters and punish its opponents, the NDP has prevented its opponents from gaining power.  Strong partisan political leaders, such as Ayman Nour, have been imprisoned on trumped-up charges.  Consequently, no true political parties exist today.

The Parliament is under the complete control of the NDP.  It operates as a rubber stamp for the legislation and budget bills submitted by the Government. In the 2005 Parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood won 20% of the seats of the lower house. While its members were able to raise issues, they were not in a position to influence the legislative agenda. Parliament rarely exercises its authority to provide oversight of government operations.

The justice system is the least discredited Egyptian institution. Judges are well trained and more conscientious than bureaucrats about pursuing the public interest. Through the Council of State, the judiciary can condemn and penalize the government for its actions. During elections, citizens trust them to resolve problems at voting stations. Yet corruption tempts judges and court administrators. In some cases, government officials can influence the outcome of cases.

As Egypt enters a post-revolutionary period, the Egyptian people will  need to take on a role not only of holding government accountable, but also of overseeing the complete restructuring of Egypt's Constitution, legal framework and democratic institutions. They will require strong support by the international community as they attempt to accomplish this decades-long set of tasks.

Common Interests and Natural Divisions within Civil Society

Civil society groups familiar to international donors are a small percentage of those fighting for political reform and a post-revolutionary Egypt.  Egypt has a tremendous diversity of non-governmental actors, including service-oriented community groups, non-governmental organizations, private sector associations, religious organizations, labor movements, media and political parties.  While the vast majority of these organizations never took a position regarding political reform, all of them were forced to deal with State Security and other governmental bodies to assure their survival. They therefore had a certain degree of political awareness and an understanding of the efforts of the Mubarak regime to control all aspects of society.  Some analysts have called this phenomenon "black hole government," in which governments let no aspect of social or political life escape their control.

In reality, the Mubarak regime only exercised control over civil society groups sporadically, when it wished to make a political statement. Most of the time, it chose not to use constitutional and legal tools of repression. Consequently, many groups took advantage of the periods when the government was not paying attention to them. For example, the anti-Mubarak group Kifaya (Enough), or the Egyptian Movement for Change, formed in 2004 during a period when the Mubarak regime was using "window-dressing" to make the Bush Administration believe it was truly committed to political reform. Under the banner of opposition to Mubarak, Kifaya brought together groups with conflicting ideologies and visions, such as secularists and Islamists.  Kifaya organized many demonstrations calling for lifting the emergency laws in place since 1981, removing restrictions on forming political parties and newspapers, and  releasing thousands of political prisoners. From 2004-2007, other professional and demographic groups organized resistance against Mubarak, including teachers, students, women, lawyers, journalists and even judges. They were joined in the last three years by wildcat strikers, who refused to abide by government control of their labor unions and syndicates.  Journalists and editors were arrested or fined for writing articles that were judged too critical of Mubarak.

These broad coalitions were able to identify the lowest common denominator among the interests of their members, such as moving toward free elections, reforming the constitution, lifting emergency laws and freeing political prisoners. They recognized that these objectives were more urgent than advancing such goals as strengthening a secular form of governance, moving the legal system toward Sharia or extending civil liberties to Coptic Christians.  Secular groups and the Muslim Brotherhood found common cause in opposing Mubarak, similar to the center, left and communist parties who formed popular fronts in Europe and the US in the 1930's.

Such alliances will be hard to maintain after the fall of Mubarak.  With effort, their constituent groups will maintain enough cohesion to push through the Constitutional and legal changes required to create the democratic institutions needed to mediate their conflicting interests. Unless the Presidential elections scheduled for September 2011 are postponed, however, these alliances have a strong chance of being short-lived.

Rick Gold

USAID support to Egyptian Human Rights and Political Reform Groups

To gain insight into the anti-Mubarak movement, it is important to understand the type of support some of the key civil society organizations received from donors.  The democracy grants issued by USAID from 2005 through 2009 built the capacity of these organizations.  The major issue we confronted was whether to confine our funding to those non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that were registered with the Ministry of Social Solidarity.  Such organizations, even those dedicated to human rights, operated under severe restrictions and were under the complete control of State Security.  On the other hand, it also was possible to provide grants to "civil companies," which were registered as private companies with a social purpose.  While these companies were required to coordinate informally with State Security, they operated with much more freedom than NGOs. 

USAID funded both types of organizations during this period.  In response to strong pressure from the Mubarak regime against funding civil companies, USAID restricted its funding to legally registered NGOs beginning in about 2009.  The human rights organizations funded by USAID after 2009 operated with less freedom and closer oversight from the State Security apparatus.

From 2005-2009, USAID approved over 50 grants valued at over $40 million. Egyptian NGOs included:

• Alliance for Arab Women
• Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services (CEOSS)
• New Horizons
• Environmental Quality International
• South Egypt Development Association at Qena
• Kanater
• BWADI
• GAYD
• Egyptian NGO Support Center
• Association for the Development of Education
• El Nakib Center

Some of the civil companies and law firms included:

• Arab Penal Reform Organization
• Andalus Institute
• United Group
• Ibn Khaldun Center
• Afro-Egyptian Human Rights Organization
• One World Foundation
• Maat

Other grants went to American or international organizations that partnered with Egyptian organizations, including:

• CEDPA
• Internews
• National Democratic Institute
• International Republican Institute
• International Foundation for Electoral Systems
• American Bar Association 
• America's Development Foundation
• Freedom House

The grants funded a wide range of activities, including:

• election monitoring;
• promoting political engagement of youth, women, and the disabled;
• using the media for civic education;
• defending journalists;
• promoting freedom of information;
• providing legal assistance to the poor and vulnerable;
• cultivating human rights activists;
• strengthening civil society oversight of government;
• increasing participation in local decision-making; and
• building a human rights culture.

USAID examined the management controls of each organization receiving funding and provided assistance to strengthen these controls.  Consequently, the management skills and systems of these human rights organizations improved, making them eligible for larger grants from multiple donors.

USAID grants to human rights and political reform organizations helped them to undertake activities to expand rights and build citizen support for democracy.  More importantly, the grants also strengthened the capacity of these organizations to undertake the long struggle necessary to build a movement with enough cohesion to remove Mubarak from office.  As Egypt moves into a post-revolutionary environment, its success in putting in place viable democratic institutions will depend upon the capacity of Egyptian civil society organizations to play their role. It is essential that they focus on building their capacity as they take on increased responsibility to lead Egypt into the future. USAID and other donors should undertake a major initiative to build politically engaged civil society, regardless of the registration status of these organizations.

Rick Gold

Adding Context to the Discussion on Egypt's future

We know that President Mubarak will soon be history. And we know that civil society groups will be responsible for his ouster.  While much of the discussion by bloggers and the formal media have focused on the anti-Mubarak and pro-Mubarak factions, we have heard little about the organizers of the marches and demonstrations.  We have seen little analysis of the strength of the human rights organizations and political reform groups, how they have built their capacity and what role they might play in post-revolutionary Egypt.

I intend to add this missing dimension of the analysis of today's events and prognosis for the future.  From 2004-2007, I oversaw USAID's portfolio of democracy programs in Egypt.  Many of these programs were designed and implemented by Egyptian organizations, and USAID funded them despite tremendous hostility from the Egyptian Government and the state-financed media.  My experience with hundreds of Egyptian organizations has given me some insight into the political environment that kept them weak and divided and delayed the development of the political movement that is unseating Mubarak. 

I want to emphasize that we are witnessing the struggle of the Egyptian people, and that any efforts by donors such as USAID to strengthen civil society groups and democratic institutions were intended to enable these groups to build a movement that reflected their own values and interests. What we are seeing today is the recognition that all of these groups have one common interest - removing Mubarak.  I hope to identify where their interests diverge and how that might influence the formation of coalitions that cooperate and compete for power, in a post-Mubarak Egypt. 
Rick Gold